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RELAXATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PLANS 
UNDER THE 1977 CLEAN AIR ACT 
AMENDMENTS 
.David P. Currie* 
INTRODUCTION 
Though the Clean Air Act gives the Environmental Protection 
Agency considerable powers to regulate both mobile and stationary 
air-pollution sources directly, 1 everyday control of most existing sta-
tionary sources remains subject to an awkward joint federal-state 
program based on ambient air-quality standards.2 The core of this 
program is section 109, under which the EPA promulgates primary 
air-quality standards "requisite to protect the public health" and sec-
ondary standards "requisite to protect the public welfare from any 
known or anticipated adverse effects."3 Under section 110, the states 
then submit plans to the EPA for "attainment and maintenance" of 
the primary standards within three years and of the secondary stan-
dards within "a reasonable time."4 
The most striking feature of this scheme is its absoluteness: Sec-
* Hany N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Chairman, Illinois Pollution 
Control Board, 1970-1972. A.B. 1957, University of Chicago; LL.B. 1960, Harvard Univer-
sity.-Ed. My thanks to Mark Reinhardt, J.D. 1978, Chicago, and to Scott Bieber, J.D. 1979, 
Chicago, for thoughtful papers that helped shape my thinking on this subject. This Article is 
part of a forthcoming book on the Clean Air Act as a whole. 
l. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7521, 7603 (Supp. I 1977). See Currie, The Mobile-Source 
Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 811 (1979); Currie, J)irect Federal Regula-
tion of Stationary Sources Under the Clean Air Act, - U. PA. L. REV.- (1980) (forthcoming). 
Congressional efforts to clean the air have a longer history than one might suspect. The first 
significant piece oflegislation on the subject was the Clean Air Act of 1955, Pub. L. 84-159, ch. 
360, 69 Stat. 322, July 14, 1955 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858). After periodic 
revisions, Congress overhauled the Act with the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-
604, 84 Stat. 1676, Dec. 31, 1970 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858) [hereinafter 
cited as Clean Air Amendments of 1970]. In 1977, Congress revamped the Act again. Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat.-685, Aug. 7, 1977 (recodified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401-7642 (Supp. I 1977)) [hereinafter cited as Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977]. As its 
name implies, this Article scrutinizes these latest congressional efforts. 
2. For a detailed exploration of the relevant provisions as they stood before the 1977 
amendments, see Currie, Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their Implementation, 1976 A.B.F. 
RES. J. 365. 
3. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 109, as amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977, § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. I 1977). 
4. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 110, as amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977, § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. I 1977). 
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tions 109 and 110 flatly command that all adverse effects of air pollu-
tion be eliminated without regard to cost, and the Senate Committee 
in 1970 coldly confirmed this conclusion: "[E]xisting sources of pol-
lutants either should meet the standard of the law or be closed 
down. . . ."5 The Supreme Court in dictum agreed: "Section 
110( a )(2)(A)'s three-year deadline for achieving primary air quality 
standards . . . leaves no room for claims of technological or eco-
nomic feasibility."6 
The harshness of the statutory requirements was dramatized by 
their implications for Los Angeles, which in the warmer months 
would have had to reduce vehicle travel by eighty-two percent to 
meet the primary ambient standard for photochemical oxidants by 
the statutory deadline of 1975.7 Without minimi7.ing the desirability 
of eliminating Los Angeles smog, 8 one might wonder whether it 
would be worth the cost of shutting the city down. 
Nevertheless, following the plain command of section 
110(a)(2)(A), the EPA promulgated gasoline-rationing regulations 
for Calif omia, and the Ninth Circuit duly upheld them: "[H]aving 
recognized that no alternative exists which is capable of attaining the 
requisite standards, petitioners have implicitly accepted the necessity 
of this regulation."9 Yet the EPA responded to its victory by revok-
ing the rationing requirement, reasoning that its enforcement would 
have "extremely adverse social and economic consequences" and 
noting that both houses of Congress, by passing separate bills that if 
enacted would have afforded relief, had "affirmatively expressed 
their desire" that Los Angeles be spared. At the same time, the EPA 
steadfastly maintained that it would not generally accept cost as an 
excuse for ignoring the clear statutory command; this was a "special 
case."10 
The Los Angeles accommodation underscored the failure of 
Congress to make adequate provision for ameliorating even the most 
ruinous costs of achieving rigid air quality standards. Of necessity, 
legislators write statutes to fit typical cases, and pollution statutes 
commonly contain an escape valve that authorizes variances when 
5. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). 
6. Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 2S8 (1976), 
1. See 38 Fed. Reg. 2194-2200 (1973). 
8. See U.S. DEPT, OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR 
PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTSpassim (NAPCA Pub. No. AP-63 (1970)). 
9. City of Santa Rosa v. Environmental Protection Agency, 534 F.2d 150, 154 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
10. See 41 Fed. Reg. 45565 (1976). See also 1 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 920 (1976). 
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compliance would impose unreasonable hardship.11 Congress, how-
ever, did not follow this maxim in drafting the Clean Air Act. Al-
though the 1970 Amendments contained two provisions allowing 
limited extensions of the deadlines relating to air-quality standards, 
both fell far short of protecting dischargers from being forced to take 
economically unreasonable action. Under section ll0(e), 12 which 
the 1977 Amendments left intact, the EPA Administrator may ex-
tend the date for compliance with a primary standard for not more 
than two years; under former section ll0(f),13 which was repealed in 
1977, he could postpone the applicability of an implementation-plan 
requirement to an individual source for not more than one year. In 
neither case, however, had the affected polluter any right to invoke 
the remedy:. The governor had to make the request, and politics 
might preclude his doing so in a deserving case. Moreover, neither 
provision clearly made unreasonable cost a basis for relief: The Ad-
ministrator had to be convinced that the necessary technology was 
"not available" in time to meet the standard and, in the case of sec-
tion ll0(f), that continued operation of the polluting source was "es-
sential to national security or to the public health or welfare."14 
Although Los Angeles received an extension to 1977 under section 
110( e ), the consensus has been that it was not renewable; yet compli-
ance was just as unthinkable in 1977 as in 1975.15 
Courts and administrators, however, generally find ways around 
unreasonable statutory requirements, and the Clean Air Act was no 
exception. In the case of Los Angeles, for instance, the EPA simply 
cast aside the troublesome rationing provisions, section 1 lO's com-
mands notwithstanding.16 Other sections of the Act, however, may 
have offered more defensible escape hatches. Section 113, in provid-
ing that the Administrator "may" issue an enforcement order to seek 
11. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Act § 35, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1035 
(1973). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e) (Supp. I 1977). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e)(l) & (f)(l) (1976) (repealed 1977). 
14. For discussion of these provisions, see Currie, supra note 2, at 380-85. 
15. State variances offered no means of escape for Los Angeles. After considerable litiga-
tion, the Supreme Court foreclosed that route in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
421 U.S. 60 (1975), holding that a state variance could be approved as a plan revision under 
§ 1 IO(a)(3)(A) only ifit did not interfere with the timely attainment of ambient standards. The 
House Committee in 1977 declared its intention "to confirm the correctness of the Supreme 
Court's opinion in the Train case." H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1977), re-
printed in (1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 1077, 1135. The Sixth Circuit confirmed that 
Train survived the 1977 Amendments in Ohio Env. Council v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 593 F.2d 24, 32-33 (6th Cir. 1979). 
16. See text at notes 4-6 supra. 
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judicial enforcement, 17 appeared to afford the traditional flexibility 
of prosecutorial discretion. 18 Moreover, section 113(a)(4) suggested 
another possibility for relief from undue hardship by directing the 
Administrator to specify a "reasonable" time for compliance in issu-
ing an enforcement order. 19 Despite an early court decision that 
"[s]ection 113 is simply not an appropriate vehicle ... for ... se-
curing a variance,"20 the EPA took advantage of the apparent loop-
hole, and the Supreme Court in Union Electric Co. v. EPA 
apparently endorsed that conduct: . "Claims of technological or eco-
nomic infeasibility, the Administrator agrees, are relevant to fash-
ioning an appropriate compliance order under§ I 13(a)(4):"21 
Such, then, was the sorry state of the law before 1977: a require-
ment that standards be set to achieve absolute freedom from adverse 
health effects, with wholly inadequate variance provisions and with 
relief provided under the table without either hearings or public par-
ticipation. Congress responded by enacting the 1977 Amendments, 
which allow temporary relief from the Draconian deadlines of the 
1970 Act, but still do not acknowledge the unpleasant possibility that 
total elimination of pollution's harmful effects may even in the long 
run not be worth the cost. 
This Article probes the convoluted ameliorative provisions of the 
1977 Amendments in three parts. Section I deals with delayed com-
pliance orders - orders granted to stationary sources unable to meet 
the statutory deadlines for compliance. Section 113( d) is the foun-
tainhead provision, and besides a general provision for delayed com-
pliance, it also contains specific provisions for sources unable to 
comply due to retirement of present facilities, due to investment in 
innovative facilities with the promise of greater pollution reduction 
in the future or due to government orders to convert from cleaner 
fuels to coal. 
Section II analyzes two specific relief provisions intended to go 
17. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, supra note I,§ 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1976). 
18. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1002, 1003-05 (N.D. 
Ala. 1976). Cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 659-60 (3d Cir. 1976) (describing 
the EPA's practice under the 1972 version of the Water Pollution Control Act of issuing "En-
forcement Compliance Schedule Letters" that fixed compliance deadlines, as a matter of 
"prosecutorial discretion," at a date later than that prescribed in the statute). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1957c-8(a)(4) (1976). 
20. Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (D. Del, 
1972). On appeal, the Third Circuit held there was no jurisdiction to consider the issue be-
cause in effect the plaintiff was challenging the validity of the implementation plan contrary to 
§ 307(b). Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). For criticism of this holding see Currie, Judicial Review Under 
Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1221, 1254-58 (1977). 
21. Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 268 (1976). 
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beyond section 113(d). It first examines section 119, essentially a 
special delayed compliance order applicable only to nonferrous 
smelters. It then reviews the provisions in section 110 that grant 
temporary relief for energy and economic emergencies. 
Section III examines the nonattainment provisions, which tackle 
the problem most graphically posed by Los Angeles: how to achieve 
and maintain ambient standards in areas suffering from excessive 
pollution, without bringing both new development and the economy 
to a standstill. 
I. DELAYED COMPLIANCE ORDERS 
As congressional committees convened in 1977 to reconsider the 
provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act, they acknowledged that some 
accommodation had to be made for the estimated 3500 major 
sources that had not met section 110 deadlines22 and that the old 
variance provision of section I IO(f) was "too restrictive."23 On the 
other hand, the Senate Committee found "no basis in law" for the 
EPA's practice of issuing orders for delayed compliance under sec-
tion 113(a)(4),24 and neither committee thought that practice satis-
factory on the merits. The House Committee complained that 
section 113 placed no limits on the length oftime the Administrator 
might deem "unreasonable," did not require state approval for the 
delay, and provided no opportunity for public participation.25 The 
Senate Committee added that delayed compliance orders under the 
old section 113 left a discharger "subject to citizen suits and to poten-
tial inconsistent enforcement action taken by the Administrator."26 
The remedy was a new section 113( d), embodying a bewildering 
battery of prescriptions. The provision explicitly recognized delayed 
compliance orders for the first time: 
A State ( or, after thirty days notice to the State, the Administrator) 
may issue to any stationary source which is unable to comply with any 
requirement of an applicable implementation plan an order which 
specifies a date for final compliance with such requirement later than 
the date for attainment of any national ambient air quality standard 
specified in such plan if -
22. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1977). 
23. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1134. 
24. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1977). 
25. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1134. 
26. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1977). 
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(D) the order provides for final compliance . . . as expeditiously as 
practicable but ... in no event later than July 1, 1979, or three years 
after the date for final compliance with such requirement specified in 
such plan, whichever is later .... 27 
A delayed-compliance order (DCO) under the new section may be 
issued only after "notice to the public . . . and opportunity for pub-
lic hearing" and must contain "a schedule and timetable for compli-
ance"28 as well as interim requirements for monitoring, reporting, 
and control, including measures to avoid "imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health of persons."29 An order must warn any 
"major source" that a "noncompliance penalty" will be assessed if 
the new deadline is not met.30 Although the Administrator may is-
sue a DCO without state consent, state and local authorities are free 
to demand "more expeditious ... compliance."31 On the other 
hand, no state may grant a DCO to a "major" source unless the Ad-
ministrator affirmatively finds that the order was issued "in accord-
ance with the requirements" of the Act, and he may veto any other 
state order ifhe determines that it was not so issued.32 If the Admin-
istrator "so objects," he "shall simultaneously proceed to issue'' an 
enforcement order.33 
The new section also revamped enforcement mechanisms to ac-
commodate the new DCO's: An order issued under section 113( d) is 
a defense to any federal or private effort to compel earlier compli-
ance.34 A state-issued order, but not a federal one, becomes "a part 
of the applicable implementation plan."35 Should a discharger vio-
late a DCO, the Administrator "shall" enforce the offended require-
ment by suit or order, revoke the order after a record hearing, or sue 
for a noncompliance penalty, evidently without regard to duplica-
tion of any state enforcement efforts.36 
27. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § I 13(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (Supp. I 1977). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(7)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(E) (Supp. I 1977). Noncompliance penalties are set forth in 
42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. I 1977). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977). 
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977). The EPA evidently interprets this direction to 
apply only to its actual veto of state orders for nonmajor sources, declaring that when it disap-
proves a major-source order it may either issue an order of its own or go directly to court. See 
EPA Environmental Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section I 13(a), (d) Orders, 9 EN-
VIR. REP. (BNA) 715, 718 (1978). 
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(IO) (Supp. I 1977). 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(I I) (Supp. I 1977). 
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(9) (Supp. I 1977). A grandfather clause preserves orders 
under the old § I 13 to the extent consistent with the new law, and singles out for approval 
otherwise excessively long extensions previously granted to Louisville Gas & Electric Co., in 
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The new provision responds to the deficiencies of prior law iden-
tified by the committee reports. It is less restrictive than the old sec-
tion ll0(f)-it eliminates the necessity for a governor's request and 
it abandons the requirement that continued operation be "essential." 
Yet unlike the old section 113, it establishes time limits, it brings 
states prominently into the process, and it guarantees public partici-
pation through hearings. Furthermore, the section shields a source 
receiving an extension against collateral citizen and federal enforce-
ment actions. Yet section 113( d) bristles with difficulties of its own, 
both of interpretation and of policy. I shall discuss them in the fol-
lowing sequence: (A) standards for DCO eligibility, (B) time limits, 
(C) degree of discretion, (D) hearing requirements, and (E) special 
provisions for retirement, innovation and coal conversion. 
A. The Standards for Eligibility 
Section 113(d) is remarkably uninformative about the requisites 
for allowing delayed compliance. In authorizing relief for any sta-
tionary source that is "unable to comply" with an implementation-
plan requirement, the statute fails to give clear answers to three obvi-
ous questions: whether one qualifies for an extension if his present 
inability to comply is the result of his own inexcusable conduct; 
whether a source is entitled to an extension if the means for compli-
ance are available, but only at unreasonable cost; and whether in-
ability to comply justifies an extension that would perpetuate an 
unreasonable health hazard. 
l. Good Faith 
On its face the requirement that a source be "unable to comply" 
imposes no requirement of good faith in past efforts to achieve 
timely compliance; the sole criterion seems to be present inability to 
meet the deadline. The EPA has accordingly held good faith irrele-
vant: A source is eligible for a DCO "regardless of its past history" 
so long as it is unable to comply.37 Three arguments underpin the 
Agency's interpretation. First, the explicit good-faith requirement of 
appreciation of its willingness to help "demonstrate flue gas desulfurization technology." 42 
U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l2)(A)(B) (Supp. I 1977). See 123 CONG. REc. H8664 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 
1977) (clarifying statement), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1570, 1574. 
See also H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1502, 1514. 
37. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section l 13(a), (d), Or-
ders, supra note 33, at 718-19. 
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the old section l lO(f),38 the predecessor provision, is conspicuously 
absent from section 113( d).39 Second, the silence of section 113 
stands in stark contrast to section 120's provision excluding noncom-
pliance penalties when the "inability to· comply" "results from rea-
sons entirely beyond the control of the owner or operator."40 When 
read together, the two sections suggest that DCO's may be issued to 
sources unable to comply due to inadequate past efforts. Finally, the 
Senate Committee specifically rejected a test of prior good faith be-
cause it felt the requirement "would place an excessive burden on 
the manpower and resources of the States and BP A."41 All these 
considerations will probably lead courts to defer to the EPA's rea-
sonable conclusion that good faith is not required.42 
Unfortunately, the absence of a good-faith requirement in sec-
38. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § l lO(f) (amended 1977) (current version at 42 U.S,C, 
§ 1710 (Supp. I 1977)). 
39. See generally H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977), reprinted in (1977) 
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1134. 
40. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, sec. 118, § 120(a)(2)(B)(iv), at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7420(a)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. I 1977). 
41. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1977). 
42. The issue is not, however, entirely certain. When it first adopted § I 13(d), Congress 
accepted "the Senate provision on issuance of enforcement orders," H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1502, 1514. The 
Senate version, however, contained no reference to the requirement of inability to comply. 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, supra note I,§ 112; see S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., Isl 
Sess. 46 (1977). A later "technical" amendment inserted the present "unable to comply" lan-
guage from the House bill in order to remedy an "erroneous omission" from the original pro-
vision. Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-190, § 14(14), 91 Stat. 1393, 
1400 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(I) (Supp. I 1977)). See a/so 123 CONG. REC. HI 1,954, 
HI 1,957 (daily ed. Nov. I, 1977). The House Committee had given four specific examples of 
circumstances that would render a source "unable to comply": (I) means of compliance with 
the plan had not been "adequately demonstrated"; (2) means of compliance were unobtainable 
due to "shortage"; (3) compliance was prevented by "delay of replacement facilities"; or (4) 
compliance was not possible due to "such entirely uncontrollable events as embargoes, strikes, 
or natural disasters," H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1977), reprinted in (1977) 
U.S. CODE & Ao. NEWS 1077, I 137-38. Except for delay attributable to a replacement facility, 
these examples are all of factors over which the discharger is most unlikely to have any con-
trol. This pattern suggests that the Committee intended the delay of a replacement to be an 
excuse only ifit was not due to the discharger's fault, and indeed that was the requirement of 
the earlier bill, H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 103(c)(l){D) (1975), from which the exam-
ple was taken without indication of disagreement with its particulars. Thus, although the 
Committee did not intend the list to be exclusive, the illustrations do suggest that the Commit-
tee intended "inability to comply" to mean inability for reasons the discharger could not help, 
and therefore to sanction only extensions dependent on good faith. 
Thus, Congress first adopted the Senate's language, which excluded good faith; then it 
adopted the House's language, which on its face confirms the Senate's intention, but which the 
House apparently intended to require good faith. However, since Congress adopted the House 
language without suggesting any awareness that it favored the House interpretation over the 
Senate's interpretation, since the Conference Committee had said it was adopting the Senate 
version, since the Committee was the more explicit in expressly rejecting a requirement of 
good faith, and since the Senate interpretation is the more natural reading of the final statutory 
language, I conclude that the statute does not require good faith. 
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tion 113(d) may reward foot-dragging and place those who did com-
ply with the onerous 1970 requirements at an unjust competitive 
disadvantage. Without a DCO, the polluter whose delay is the result 
of inadequate efforts could be socked with continuing penalties until 
he complied; but section ll0(d)(l) expressly forbids any federal en-
forcement proceeding "based upon noncompliance during the period 
the order is in effect."43 Under section 120, a major source some-
times will have to pay a "noncompliance penalty" adequate to offset 
''the economic value" of unjustified delay beyond July I, 1979, 
notwithstanding the existence of a DCO.44 But it seems unaccounta-
ble that Congress has allowed the miscreant to be spared penalties 
from the date of a DCO until mid-1979, or, in some cases, for a 
period thereafter.45 
2. Unreasonable Cost 
Pollution statutes typically accommodate economic as well as 
physical hardship; the apparent failure to do so, I have argued, was a 
major shortcoming of the pre-1977 variance provisions of section 
110.46 For example, a brief extension for economic hardship could 
avoid expenditures for overtime labor or expedited delivery that 
might be exorbitant; a longer one could permit perfection of an eco-
nomical alternative to prohibitively expensive existing technology, 
such as distillation of wastewater.47 
Whether section 113(d)(l)'s "unable to comply" standard em-
braces economic hardship is unclear. A neighboring provision, sec-
tion 113( d)( 4)(0), uses the term "impracticable,"48 which more 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(10) (Supp. I 1977). It does not forbid the infliction of penalties for 
violations committed before issuance of the order. Moreover, although final compliance with 
many emission requirements was not necessary before 1975 (and possibly not before 1977 in 
regions in which ambient deadlines were extended under§ l lO(e)), penalties for violation of 
interim requirements such as purchasing equipment might accrue much earlier. However, the 
statute made provision for civil penalties only in 1977, see§ l 13(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp. 
I 1977), and they can hardly be made retroactive. Moreover, criminal sanctions seem to have 
proved ineffective. See S. REP. No. 127 (1977), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1977): "[F)ew crimi-
nal actions have been brought and great difficulties and delays have been encountered in these 
cases." 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. I 1977). For example, penalties begin to run no later than the 
date of adoption of a post-1977 standard, while a DCO may allow three years from the date on 
which compliance is prescribed. Compare§ 7420(g) with§ 7413(d)(l)(D). 
45. For example, if a standard adopted after mid-1977 allows less than three years for 
compliance, any DCO period within those three years appears to be free from penalties. 42 
U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. I 1977). 
46. See text at notes 1-21 supra. 
47. See In re Effluent Criteria, 3 Ill. P.C.B. 401, 413 (1972), where a state board found 
distillation technologically available for removing chlorides and sulfates but declined to re-
quire it on grounds of cost. 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4)(D) (Supp. I 1977). 
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clearly includes considerations of cost, and the juxtaposition might 
suggest that Congress intended the distinction. Moreover, none of 
the examples of "inability" cited in the House Committee Report 
involved problems of cost;49 and the Senate Committee, commenting 
on a bill that only prescribed compliance as soon as "practicable," 
nonetheless stated that delay could not be allowed "simply for con-
venience or for economic advantages which would accrue from 
delayed compliance."50 
On the other hand, the requirement that compliance under a 
DCO be achieved as expeditiously as "practicable"51 demonstrates 
that cost was to be a factor at least in determining the duration of an 
extension. It is hard to believe Congress meant to find the same con-
sideration irrelevant in determining whether the extension should be 
-granted at all. The word "unable" does not necessarily exclude cost 
considerations: While one is always physically able to comply by 
closing a factory, no one would argue that is what Congress had in 
mind.52 As for the legislative history, prohibitive or unreasonable 
cost may not be what the Senate Committee meant in rejecting "eco-
nomic advantages," which sounds like a reference to ordinary prof-
its. More significantly, the House Committee, commenting on the 
language found in the present statute, explicitly stated that both 
"economic and technical feasibility may be considered, under the 
conditions expressly provided for in the statute, including under a 
DCO application."53 Finally, the apparent absence of a good-faith 
requirement lends further support to the conclusion that cost may be 
considered: It seems unlikely that Congress perversely intended to 
grant relief to dischargers whose physical inability is their own fault 
but not to those facing unreasonable expenses beyond their control. 
The EPA and the courts should therefore construe "unable to com-
ply" to include inability due to exorbitant costs, in accordance with 
the traditional and sensible variance criterion of unreasonable hard-
49. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-60 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1137-38. 
50. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1977). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(D) (Supp. I 1977). 
52. Courts have used analogous reasoning in assessing cost considerations in other federal 
regulatory statutes. In the context of occupational health and safety, the D.C. Circuit has 
construed the term "feasible" -which is quite close to§ I 13(d)'s "unable to comply" standard 
- to allow consideration of cost: "[I]t would comport with common usage to say that a stan-
dard that is prohibitively expensive is not 'feasible,'" Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 499 
F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (construing § 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976)). 
53. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1146. 
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ship. By inserting a single phrase, however, Congress could have 
spared us any doubts. 
3. The Extent of the Health Hazard 
As I have previously noted, the typical variance criterion is "un-
reasonable hardship," which allows a comparison of the costs and 
benefits of compliance.54 Section 113(d), however, makes no refer-
ence to the benefits of compliance - anyone may receive an exten-
sion if ''unable to comply." Yet one can certainly envision situations 
where a source that cannot otherwise comply should be shut down. 
For example, a source's emissions may be causing widespread dis-
ease or ruining a profitable nearby business, while the benefits of its 
operation are minimal. While the statute proscribes a DCO for any 
"imminent and substantial endangerment to health," it does not 
foreclose issuance of a DCO in other cases of unreasonable harm. 
Congress should have made clear that no variance may be permitted 
unless the cost of immediate compliance significantly outweighs the 
benefits. 
B. The Time Limit 
An order under section 113( d) must call for compliance "as expe-
ditiously as practicable." Thus, the statute quite sensibly allows the 
extent of hardship to determine the duration of relief. However, the 
section places specific limits on the length of time practicability may 
demand. The Senate bill contained a flat 1979 deadline; the House 
bill would have limited the "aggregate" of extensions to five years 
beyond "the date on which, but for this section . . . compliance 
would have been required."55 The provision adopted out of the Con-
ference Committee incorporates elements of both bills. Except for 
certain speci~l orders that I shall discuss below, compliance must 
come "in no event later than July 1, 1979, or three years after the 
date for final compliance with such requirement specified in such 
plan, whichever is later."56 
At first glance this language, unlike that of the Senate and House 
bills, does not appear to impose an absolute deadline, for arguably 
the new date set in the section 113 order is itself a "requirement spec-
ified in [the] plan," from which a further extension may be granted. 
Section 113(d)(ll) superficially appears to confirm this possibility: 
54. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1035 (1973). 
55. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1977); see S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 166 (1977). 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(d) (Supp. I 1977). 
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"any order issued by the State and in effect pursuant to this subsec-
tion shall become part of the applicable state plan."57 It does so, 
however, only "for the purposes of sections 110, 304, and 307," not 
for purposes of section 113( d) itself. This provision, which existed in 
the Senate bill,58 seems to have been designed to assure citizen en-
forcement and judicial review of delayed-compliance orders, not to 
sanction repeated extensions. The Conference Committee indicated 
its adherence to the absolute deadlines of both bills: "Orders are 
limited to not more than 3 years delay . . . ."59 Finally, as the 
Supreme Court said in Union Electric, the function of a conference 
committee is to reconcile differences between House and Senate 
bills, not to depart from their common provisions.60 Hence the date 
specified in an earlier section 113(d) order is not one "specified in 
[the] plan" within the meaning of that section, and therefore such an 
order may not be renewed.61 
Having concluded that the time limitation is absolute, I think it 
misguided. The House Committee gave a number of reasons for it: 
The importance of protecting health, the risk of abuse of administra-
tive discretion, the desirability of an incentive for developing tech-
nology, and the belief that "5 years would be the maximum . . . 
extension ... needed in most instances."62 Even disregarding the 
provision's failure to afford a full five years to any source facing a 
deadline in 1975 or later, how can one be confident that five years 
will suffice for each of the more than 3500 noncomplying sources, 
without exploring their varying circumstances and without clairvoy-
ance about what new impediments will arise during the next five 
years? The purpose of any variance provision is to accommodate 
cases not fitting the general pattern; it should not itself be procrus-
tean. Health is of course important, but section 113( d) recognizes 
that countervailing considerations may predominate before 1979; I 
see no reason to think they might not do so in some cases thereafter. 
"Technology-forcing" is fine, but the discharger may be in no posi-
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l I) (Supp. I 1977). 
58. See S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1977). 
59. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1502, 1514. 
60. See Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 262-63 (1976). 
61. The three-year provision could be invoked to provide a post-1979 date if the plan itself 
(as revised, for example, or to implement a new air-quality standard) provided for compliance 
after July I, 1976. See also EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section 
113(a), (d) Orders, supra note 33, at 720 & n.• (§ II0(e) extension and plan readopted after 
invalidation by court). 
62. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1142-43. 
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tion to develop the necessary technology. Conditioning further ex-
tension on proof of the discharger's best efforts toward reducing 
emissions, or the rejected House provision requiring financial contri-
butions toward the development of controls,63 would have served 
Congress's purpose without imposing the potential hardship of an 
inflexible schedule. A check on administrative abuse could have 
been provided, as in Illinois, 64 by authorizing brief and renewable 
extensions conditioned on satisfactory progress, subject to legislative 
oversight. Instead, the wasteful process of still another congressional 
amendment, the remedy contemplated by the House Committee, 65 
seems virtually inevitable under section 113(d); it might well have 
been avoided if Congress had not been so extraordinarily mistrustful 
of the EPA's ability to administer a flexible standard. 
C. .Discretion 
Section 113(d) provides that an extension "may" be issued to a 
source that cannot comply, not that it "shall" be.66 Accordingly, the 
Agency has announced in its guidelines that it will not issue exten-
sions to all who qualify.67 The legislative history confirms this inter-
pretation. Both bills used the term "may." The Senate Report was 
silent on the question of discretion, but the House Report was ex-
plicit: "This section authorizes, but does not require, the issuance of 
a DCO . . . . Thus, a source which has borne the burden of provid-
ing [sic] its eligibility for ... a DCO ... has not created any enti-
tlement thereto."68 
One might think that the need to allow relief for unreasonable 
hardship is so obvious that Congress should not have left the matter 
to the discretion of states and an administrative agency. Part of the 
answer lies in the delicate statutory balance of federal-state relations: 
a state may refuse to grant an extension because under section 116 it 
63. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371-72 (1977). 
64. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill 1/2, §§ 1035-1037 (1973). 
65. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1143. 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (Supp. I 1977). 
67. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section I 13(a), (d) Or-
ders, supra note 33, at 715-16. The statutory language alone is not conclusive. The Illinois 
Pollution Control Board, for example, operating under a variance provision employing the 
same word "may," assumed the legislature had meant for those who qualified to be given 
relief, and the Illinois courts ordered variances granted when they found the Board's denial 
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See Seegren v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 291 N.E.2d 347 (1972). 
68. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1145. 
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may impose standards more stringent than federal law requires.69 
The House Committee justified giving the federal agency discretion 
by arguing that "the Administrator stands in a position of the 
State"70 regarding a plan he has adopted and that discretion pro-
motes the development of technology: "If an order were mandated 
whenever the conditions . . . were met, sources might be encouraged 
to devote their sole or primary effort to perfecting their case for an 
order, rather than to the task of research and development to make 
available the equipment needed to comply."71 
This reasoning is quite unpersuasive. In relevant respects the 
Administrator does not stand in the same position as a state; he is the 
instrument of congressional policy, not another sovereign with in-
dependent responsibility to protect its people. As for technology-
forcing, again I think Congress has carried its point too far. Techno-
logical advancement can be encouraged by making good-faith efforts 
to innovate a prerequisite for an extension, without conferring upon 
the Agency discretion to exact compliance despite unreasonable 
hardship. Indeed, the diversion of effort from research to litigation 
is likely to be just as great when an administrator defines who will be 
given a variance as when the statute does. 
Nevertheless, the discretion conferred by section 113( d) is a par-
tial antidote to the overly lax threshold requirement of inability to 
comply with the plan. The states and the Administrator may limit 
extensions to situations where the cost of shutdown exceeds the ben-
efits, or where commitments are made to develop technology, or 
where past efforts at compliance have been in good faith. Indeed, 
they are free to determine that no extensions will be allowed at all. 72 
Exercising this discretion, the EPA has announced that it will not 
grant a DCO to any source with "an egregious history of noncompli-
ance, recalcitrance, or environmental harm" and has recommended 
that states adopt the same position.73 An earlier EPA statement had 
purported to require the states to do so,74 but the Agency abandoned 
the attempt in apparent recognition that the statute allows EPA dis-
approval of state orders only for failure to meet the statutory criteria 
69. Id. 
10. Id. at 68, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1146. 
71. Id. at 67, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1145. 
72. The legislative history related in text at note 69 supra certainly supports this last possi-
bility where a state is concerned, and the Administrator seems to possess powers at least equal 
to those of a state. 
13. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section 113(a), (d) Or-
ders, supra note 33, at 716-17. 
74. 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1131-32 (1978). 
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for eligibility. Instead, the EPA will seek penalties under section 
113(b) for pre-DCO violations in cases where it. would not have 
granted relief because of a history of recalcitrance.75 As I suggested 
earlier, a better solution would have been to allow the EPA to disap-
prove state orders on a finding of bad faith. 
The delegation of discretionary variance authority in section 
113( d) certainly improves the prior law, which essentially provided 
relief only under the table, and it is undoubtedly better than requir-
ing variances without proof of unreasonable hardship. But I see no 
justification for empowering the EPA either to refuse relief to one 
who shows such hardship or to grant it to one who does not. Regret-
tably, section 113( d) seems to give it authority to do both. 
D. Hearings 
Delayed-compliance orders under the pre-1977 section 113 were 
issued not only without public participation, but also without any 
right of a hearing for the discharger. To rectify this shortcoming, the 
new section l 13(d) requires "notice to the public ... and opportu-
nity for public hearing."76 
"Public hearing," a popular rulemaking requirement,77 com-
monly connotes the kind of hearing conducted by legislative com-
mittees.78 That is what the House Report had in mind,79 and that is 
how the EPA interprets the requirement. 80 What Congress neglected 
to consider is that the decision whether or not to give an individual 
source more time is essentially adjudicative, not legislative. The is-
sue may often be whether circumstances peculiar to a source - an 
explosion, a delay in delivery, unfavorable soil conditions - render 
it "unable to comply."81 For questions like these, legislatures have 
often insisted on trial procedures, including cross-examination and 
decision on the basis of the hearing record. 82 
75. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section 113(a), (d) Or-
ders, supra note 33, at 717. 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
77. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 l/2, § 1037 (1973). 
78. See generally Currie, The Mobile-Source Provisions of the Clear Air Act, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 811, 837-47 (1979). 
79. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1136 ("an informal, legislative-type hearing"). 
80. See EPA Enforcement Policy Memorandum on Clean Air Act Section ll3(a), (d) Or-
ders, supra note 33, at 720; 43 Fed. Reg. 44522 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 65.04). 
81. Regulations may make other adjudicative facts relevant, such as past efforts toward 
compliance, the degree of hardship a shutdown would cause, and the harm continued emis-
sions from a particular source would do to the community. 
82. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 l/2, § 1037 (1973). 
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Quasi-judicial procedures would be well-suited to determining 
factual issues about an individual source, 83 affording all concerned a 
full opportunity to present their case.84 Hence, Congress should 
amend the statute to require the state or Administrator to hold a 
quas_i-judicial hearing before issuing a DC0.85 
E. Special Provisions for Retirement, Innovation, and Coal 
Conversion 
As if the provisions of section 113( d) already discussed were not 
sufficiently complicated, Congress added special provisions for three 
specific situations. 
1. Retirement 
Section l 13(d)(3) authorized delayed-compliance orders permit-
ting operation "until July 1, 1979, without any interim schedule of 
compliance," for "any source" that "intends to comply by means of 
replacement of the facility, a complete change in production process, 
or a termination of operation." The discharger had to post a "bond 
or other surety" "in an amount equal to the cost of actual compli-
ance . . . and any economic value which may accrue to the owner or 
operator . . . by reason of the failure to comply." On failure to re-
place or retire the facility in accordance with the order, the owner or 
operator would forfeit the security without hope of compromise. 86 
83. Often due process requires these procedures. For example, when a statute confers 
upon a person the right to practice law or to receive welfare payments, the Supreme Court has 
held that due process entails allowing a person meeting the statutory requirements to demand 
an adjudicative hearing with appropriate procedural safeguards, such as cross examination. 
See, eg., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Willner v. 
Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (bar admission). However, the due 
process clause protects only "life, liberty, or property," U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § I. 
While the Supreme Court has held that "property" includes interests to which one is entitled 
upon meeting statutory qualifications, as in the bar admission and welfare cases, see Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), discretion 
granted the Administrator to deny extensions to those meeting the statutory threshold, con-
firmed by express legislative history, should refute any argument of statutory entitlement to a 
delayed-compliance order: The House Committee flatly denied that the DCO provisions 
would create any "entitlement," H.R. REP, No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted 
in (1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1145. On the other hand, a property interest 
within the due process clauses may be created by regulation as well as by statute; thus, if the 
EPA or a state creates a right to a DCO, it might well be obliged to afford the discharger an 
adjudicative hearing to determine its eligibility. 
84. Members of the affected public can be given their say in an adjudicative proceeding as 
well as in a legislative one. See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1032 (1973), 
85. The statute does not specify what procedure the EPA must follow in reviewing DCO's 
granted by a state. Present EPA regulations provide an opportunity for written comments and 
furnish explanatory material to the public. 43 Fed. Reg. 44522 (1978) (to be codified in 40 
C.F.R. §§ 65.04(b) & 65.05). 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (Supp. I 1977). 
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The expiration of the 1979 deadline for retirement orders moots 
the interesting statutory-construction questions raised by this provi-
sion. 87 But two policy issues remain: why a separate retirement pro-
vision was thought necessary in the first place, and why no 
retirement order could extend beyond July 1, 1979. 
It makes sense in some cases to allow continued violation by a 
facility about to be taken out of service. A million-dollar precipita-
tor might be a reasonable investment for thirty years of emission re-
duction and wholly unreasonable for three. 88 Moreover, an 
extension might reduce pollution in the long run by stimulating in-
vestment in new facilities subject to stricter standards rather than 
makeshift improvements of outdated facilities. Yet these considera-
tions fail to explain why a separate provision was required; unless 
costs and benefits are irrelevant under the general DCO provision, a 
plant nearing the end of its life might well qualify for an order as 
"unable" to comply. Nevertheless, Congress chose to distinguish re-
tirement orders from ordinary DCO's in two important respects: in-
cluding a bond requirement and omitting an interim compliance 
schedule. The justification for the distinctions, however, is not clear. 
Bonds can be a useful incentive to compliance: they are common 
conditions of extensions in Illinois.89 But it seems peculiar to limit 
their use to cases in which the source is to be retired rather than 
controlled.90 The omission of an interim schedule seems simply mis-
guided: Interim deadlines could help to assure that the replacement 
facility is not unjustifiably delayed. 
Moreover, the 1979 cutoff date for retirement orders appears en-
tirely unjustified. As in the case of any other delayed-compliance 
order, there was no guarantee that compliance with existing plan re-
quirements would cease to be an unreasonable hardship at that 
point; that million-dollar precipitator might not be worth five years' 
control either. More important, the potential for avoiding unreason-
able hardship or encouraging new facilities by delaying compliance 
87. Among them are the degree of discretion conferred by the use of the word "may," the 
apparent inclusion of mobile sources, and the computation of the bond amount, which argu-
ably requires prediction as to the adverse effects and duration of a future violation. 
88. See Mt. Carmel Pub. Util. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 3 Ill. P.C.B. 25 (1971). 
89. See Currie, E'!forcement Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 10 Nw. U. L. Rev. 389, 471 
n.402 ( 197 5). 
90. At the same time, Congress's insistence on complete forfeiture regardless of circum-
stance seems barbaric. One can imagine, for example, a natural disaster incapacitating a new 
electric generating plant designed to replace the facility scheduled for retirement. If the exten-
sion was properly granted to begin with, a shutdown depriving innocent citizens of electricity 
would be perverse; and enforcing substantial forfeiture for continued operation would not be 
much better. 
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until retirement was not limited to plans currently in effect; if the 
retirement provision was a good idea for existing plans, it should 
have been a permanent part of the statute. 
In short, I would not have made separate provision for extensions 
in cases of retirement or replacement of sources. Appropriately flex-
ible provisions for bonds in administrable amounts should have been 
made for all delayed-compliance orders, interim schedules required 
whenever there was reason to monitor progress, and the standard for 
issuance made clearly broad enough to include retirement cases or 
any others of unreasonable hardship. 
2. Innovation 
Section 113(d)(4) allows up to five years' extension for any imple-
mentation-plan deadline for a stationary source willing to experi-
ment with new technology. To qualify for the extension, the 
proposed method must satisfy several awkwardly worded conditions: 
(1) The control method must be "likely to be adequately demon-
strated" by the time the order expires; (2) it must be "not likely to be 
employed" without the extension; (3) it must afford promise of 
greater emission reduction than "the means . . . which, but for such 
order, would be required," or an equivalent reduction at lower cost; 
and (4) compliance must be "impracticable" pending its installa-
tion.91 While most variances are granted to relieve hardship, section 
113(d)(4) is intended to encourage new technology.92 Thus, inability 
to comply on time is not required. 
The House bill would have required the new technology to be 
"adequately demonstrated" at the time the order was entered, "to 
assure that the existence of purely theoretical, experimental, or spec-
ulative technology" would not suffi.ce.93 But since technology devel-
opment needs the greatest encouragement at incipient stages, the 
House provision would have thwarted much of its own purpose. In 
contrast, the law as enacted, allowing an extension if the source can 
establish a likelihood that it will be able to demonstrate within the 
period of the order, alleviates this difficulty while remaining true to 
the House Committee's objections to delays that are not likely to 
produce results. 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4) (Supp. I 1977). 
92. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1138: "This provision authorizes the issuance ofa DCO ••• for the 
purpose of encouraging use of innovative continuous emission reduction technology or pro• 
cess." See also S. REP. No. 127,.95th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1977). 
93. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, l 138. 
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The second condition follows naturally from the purpose of the 
provision: If adequate incentives to employ new methods already 
exist, there is no need to allow a delay. Yet this condition may prove 
difficult to apply. Discerning whether a discharger requires a five-
year extension to experiment with new technology involves a heavy 
dose of speculation. 
The third condition also follows from the statutory purpose: 
Congress sought to encourage technology superior to "presently 
available means."94 Unfortunately, section l 13(d)(4)(c) does not use 
this terminology; rather it states that the new technology must be 
better than what otherwise "would be required." The provision ap-
parently assumes that present plans mandate the best available tech-
nology, but that is not necessarily so. If existing technology is 
capable of exceeding current standards, the statute would appear to 
permit an extension to develop new controls no better than those 
currently available. Luckily, the statute's use of the discretionary 
"may," coupled with the legislative history, should permit the 
Agency to insist on a promise of bettering existing technology, but 
the provision is yet another example of loose drafting. 
The final condition makes perfect sense; a source should not re-
ceive an extension if it practicably can meet present standards while 
the new equipment is being installed. In determining what is "prac-
ticable," the Administrator should bear in mind that interim control 
facilities are to be replaced in a few years by the fruits of section 
113(d)(4) technological innovation; it would defeat the purpose of 
the innovation to deny an extension because conventional controls 
would be practicable as a long-term altemative.95 
Two final aspects of section 113( d)( 4) merit attention. The provi-
sion does not authorize a blanket five-year extension, but requires 
that the new technology be applied "as expeditiously as practicable." 
Thus, while extra time is afforded, it is not a fiat reward for commit-
ting resources to development; the provision grants only the extra 
time needed to employ new technology. Of course, practicability in 
this context should include an opportunity to develop the technology 
94. Id. at 61, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1139. Congress also 
sought to encourage development of present technology at significantly lower cost, energy use, 
or nonair environmental impact. Id. 
95. The House Report's example is illustrative: Afterburners might assure interim compli-
ance with hydrocarbon standards, but their use "could result in duplicative and perhaps pro-
hibitive capital expenditures for presently available and new technology, the use of scarce 
natural gas, and the prospect of interim compliance proble~ in certain areas due to limited 
supplies of natural gas," H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1977), reprinted in [1977] 
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1139. 
174 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:155 
further, ifwe are not in effect to reinstate the rejected House require-
ment that the technology be demonstrated before the extension is 
given. Finally, the statute places the risk that the innovation will not 
work squarely on the operator, for a section 113(d)(4) order must 
require compliance within five years, regardless of success. In short, 
while the policy behind section 113(d)(4) is admirable, Congress's 
understandable caution in avoiding abuses may significantly 
dampen the enthusiasm of those intended to be lured by the carrot of 
delayed compliance. 
3. Coal Conversion 
Prompted by the oil crisis of 1973, Congress in 1974 authorized 
postponement of plan deadlines applicable to fuel-burning sources 
under circumstances prescribed in considerable detail.96 Section 
113(d)(5), adopted in 1977, replaces and extends this section. The 
new provision authorizes the Administrator to postpone until De-
cember 31, 1980, with possible renewal for another five years, any 
plan requirement applicable to a "major stationary source ... burn-
ing petroleum products or natural gas" that has been forced to con-
vert to coal either by order of the Federal Energy Administration or 
because of a government-approved curtailment of natural-gas sup-
plies. The order, however, must contain interim requirements to as-
sure that emissions from the source "will not cause or contribute to 
concentrations . . . in excess of any national primary ambient air 
quality standard," and violation of such standards anywhere in the 
Air Quality Control Region creates a rebuttable presumption against 
issuing the order.97 
Not so long ago, industries planned conversion from coal to 
cleaner fuels to reduce particulate and sulfur-oxide emissions.98 
Since then, however, conversion back to coal has become a congres-
sional policy external to the Clean Air Act.99 An operator forced to 
tum to coal may encounter extreme and blameless hardship, for it 
may take longer to build control equipment for coal's emissions than 
to accomplish the fuel switch itself.100 
Of course, a source in such a position might be "unable to com-
96. See Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 
sec. 3, § 119, 88 Stat. 246 (1974) (repealed 1977). 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(5) (Supp. I 1977). 
98. See, e.g., A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2 Ill. P.C.B. 521 
(1971). 
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 792(a) (1976). 
100. The most obvious example is a plant already equipped to bum either coal or gas, but 
without pollution controls. 
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ply" with plan requirements and thus qualify for relief under the 
general provisions of section 113(d)(l). However, the 1979 deadline 
for pre-1976 plan requirements in section 113(d)(l) was plainly too 
strict for coal conversions, especially since the FEA might issue coal-
conversion orders after 1979. Indeed, it might issue such orders after 
the 1985 deadline in the conversion provision itself; if that happens, 
Congress will have to change the statute once more. 101 The provi-
sion exemplifies a principle manifested throughout the 1977 Amend-
ments: the price of temporary provisions is continued legislative 
tinkering. 
Curiously, the coal-conversion situation, which might appear to 
off er the most compelling case for delayed compliance, is the only 
instance under section 113( d) in which no extension may postpone 
compliance with a primary air-quality standard. The notion that 
hardship should not compromise public health is of course appeal-
ing, but the other paragraphs of section 113( d) apparently concede 
that absolute health protection sometimes carries an unacceptable 
cost. 
Perhaps Congress believed that if a source failed to obtain a con-
version extension, the FEA order necessitating conversion would be 
modified accordingly. After all, requiring shutdown of an electric 
plant facing a conversion order could impose catastrophic hardships 
on the community. Nevertheless, the statute does require the order 
to be modified. 
It is also striking that coal-conversion extensions are the only sec-
tion 113(d) extensions that may be issued only by the Administrator 
and not by a state. Possibly the great potential for harm stemming 
from such extensions (limited as they are to "major" sources) in-
duced Congress to keep them under federal control, but extensions 
under the other paragraphs possess similar potential. Habit more 
likely explains the greater strictures on coal orders: Congress im-
posed the primary-standard requirement and excluded state orders 
in the 1974 coal-conversion provision. On the other hand, the states 
remain free under section 116 to impose more stringent requirements 
that may frustrate the federal policy of requiring conversion without 
unreasonable cost. 
Finally, section 113( d)(5) does not seem to cover all cases of un-
due hardship resulting from coal. conversion. The 1974 statute ex-
tended relief to certain operators who had in fact moved to coal 
IOI. The temporary nature of the provision is further underscored by the requirement that, 
to qualify for a conversion extension because of curtailment in gas supply, a source must have 
given notice by August 8, 1978. 
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without being required to. The new law, in contrast, refrains from 
encouraging conversions that are not coerced, provides no relief if 
gas has become too expensive, and gives no quarter to those whose 
oil supplies have disappeared or become unreliable. 
In short, the complex yet incomplete provisions for coal con-
version are but another illustration of Congress's insistence on pre-
scribing administrative details rather than enacting a general 
authorization for relief from unreasonable hardship. Unfortunately, 
as we move beyond section 113(d) into the other sections of the 1977 
Amendments, we will find many other examples. 
II. SMELTERS AND EMERGENCIES 
A. Smelter Orders 
Primary nonferrous smelters may qualify for delayed-compliance 
orders under the provisions of section 113( d). In the alternative, they 
may obtain relief under the new section 119,102 but no smelter "may 
receive both an enforcement order under [section 113(d)] ... and a 
primary nonferrous smelter order'' under section 119.103 
Primary nonferrous smelter orders provide relief where "no 
means of emission limitation" to meet a sulfur-oxide standard "nec-
essary and intended to be of itself sufficient" to achieve primary and 
secondary ambient standards "has been adequately demonstrated to 
be reasonably available," considering all costs. 104 Only smelters that 
existed when Congress adopted the 1977 Amendments qualify. An 
initial order may extend compliance until January 1, 1983; a second 
and final one to January 1, 1988.105 The source must take interim 
measures to prevent violation of the air-quality standards, 106 and 
those measures must "include continuous emission reduction tech-
nology" 107 unless its use ''would be so costly as to necessitate perma-
102. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 119, 42 U.S.C. § 7419 (Supp. I 1977). 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(a)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(b) (Supp. I 1977). The order may be issued either by the Adminis-
trator or, with federal approval, by a state. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(a)(I) (Supp. I 1977). 
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(c) (Supp. I 1977). 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977). This requirement provides a handhold for 
the EPA's prior practice ofm'lking the user of intermittent controls responsible for any ambi-
ent violations in the area. See note 114 i'!fra. Referring to this provision, the House Committee 
expressly said that "Any occurrence of any such standard being exceeded in a designated lia-
bility area for such a smelter would be a violation of the applicable implementation plan by 
the smelter •••. " H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 n.6 (1977), reprinted in (1977) 
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1140. 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(l)(C) (Supp. I 1977). A smelter already employing continuous 
controls need not add others unless the Administrator finds them "reasonably available." 42 
U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4) (Supp. I 1977). 
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nent or prolonged temporary cessation of operations."108 The use of 
"any such interim measures" is conditioned on agreement "to com-
mit reasonable resources to research and development of appropriate 
emission control technology."109 
1. Interpretation 
Understanding this mouthful requires a bit of background. Most 
domestic copper is produced from sulfide ores, and the process gen-
erates about two tons of sulfur dioxide for each ton of copper. 110 If 
this gas is sufficiently concentrated, it can economically be converted 
into sulfuric acid and sold. 111 
Before the 1977 Amendments, Nevada's implementation plan re-
quired Kennecott Copper Corporation to control sulfur-dioxide 
emissions by means of a relatively inefficient acid plant, and to cur-
tail copper production when adverse atmospheric conditions caused 
the remaining emissions to violate ambient standards. The EPA had 
ruled, with judicial approval, 112 that section i 10 generally required 
"continuous" rather than "intermittent" controls, 113 but it agreed 
that to require Kennecott to install a more efficient acid plant would 
be economically unreasonable and thus allowed periodic cutbacks as 
an interim measure, subject to certain conditions, 114 which the Ninth 
Circuit sustained over the company's objections in Kennecott Copper 
Cop. v. Train. 115 
In 1977 Congress codified in a new section 123 the EPA's re-
quirement that ambient standards be met by continuous controls. In 
so doing it omitted from that section the recognized exception for 
cases, such as Kennecott, in which additional continuous controls 
108. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977). 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(l)(C)(ii) (Supp. I 1977). 
110. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149, 1150 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976). 
111. See 41 Fed. Reg. 2232 (1976). While traditional scrubbing of the remaining acid-
plant emissions was considered to have bet:n "demonstrated," its use on smelters was deemed 
prohibitively expensive. Id. 
112. See, eg., Big River Elec. Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 523 F.2d 16 (6th 
Cir. 1975). 
113. The statute required that an implementation plan contain "emission limitations •.. 
and such other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such 
[air-quality] ... standard." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(B). The EPA construed this to mean that 
"other measures" could be required only if reasonable "emission limitations" were insufficient, 
and ruled that intermittent cutbacks were not "emission limitations." For criticism see Currie, 
supra note 2, at 375-77. 
114. The Agency insisted that the company employ additional continuous controls as they 
became reasonably available, required Kennecott to conduct research to speed their availabil-
ity, and made the Company agree to be responsible for any ambient violations in the area. 
115. 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976). 
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were not available at reasonable cost. 116 Thus the new section 119 
was necessary to "confirm . . . the Agency's . . . smelter policy" as 
upheld in the Kennecott case.117 
Through the lens of this history, the opaque contours of section 
119 begin to assume definition. The apparent contradiction between 
section l 19(d)(l)(A)'s requirement that air-quality standards be met 
and section l 19(b )(3)'s prerequisite that "no means of emission limi-
tation" be "reasonably available" to meet them is explained by the 
distinction between continuous and intermittent techniques. A 
smelter qualifies for relief from section 123's ban on intermittent 
measures if, as in Kennecott, it cannot reasonably achieve ambient 
standards by continuous "emission limitation" devices such as acid 
plants alone. Absent unusual circumstances, however, some contin-
uous "reasonably available control technology" will still be required 
even though it is insufficient .to meet present standards;118 further-
more, although the Conference Committee badly butchered the rele-
vant language, 119 the new section 119 requires, as approved in 
Kennecott, a commitment to develop better continuous control tech-
nology.120 
Congress could have accomplished the same result in a more de-
cipherable manner by codifying both halves of the Kennecott doc-
trine in one section: "Ambient standards must be achieved by 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (Supp. I 1977). 
117. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1139. 
I 18. As the EPA said in an explanatory document quoted with approval by the House 
Committee, "RACT [reasonably available control technology] will usually equate to control of 
all strong gas streams [through] properly operated and maintained double contact acid plants 
(or single contact acid plants where ... already on line)," 41 Fed. Reg. 7450, 7452 (1976), 
Intermittent cutbacks or high stacks will be allowed as supplementary measures when the acid 
plant alone is not enough to meet ambient standards. 
119. See H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CooE 
CONG & Ao. NEWS 1077, I 141. 
120. For the Kennecoll requirement, see note 114 supra. The House bill provided flatly 
that the smelter operator "shall" commit development resources, H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1977). It would also have conditioned the "use of any such interim mea-
sures" upon the smelter's acceptance of means to "maximize the reliability and enforceability 
qf such interim measures" and upon agreement to accept responsibility for any local ambient 
violations without proof of causation. Id. at 370-71. As adopted, the statute omitted the strict 
liability provision for local ambient violations, substituting development funds as another con-
dition of "such interim measures." The antecedent for "such" is obscure - in both the House 
bill and the statute the reference follows the requirement that "such interim measures include 
"continuous emission reduction technology." Evidently, Congress intended to refer back to 
permission to use any interim measures, not only the insufficient continuous technology, since 
the enforceability and causation provisions made sense only in relation to intermittent con-
trols. One conclusion is clear - the phraseology is poor. The statute should have made tech-
nology development a condition for gaining permission to deviate from§ 123's requirement of 
continuous emission reduction. 
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continuous emission reduction unless it is not reasonably available." 
By separating the two parts, Congress made the statute unnecessarily 
mysterious. 121 Furthermore, by limiting the Kennecott qualification 
to sulfur dioxide emissions from smelters, Congress ran the risk of 
underinclusiveness: there may be future ambient requirements at-
tainable only through methods outlawed by section 123. Once again, 
Congress could have solved the problem adequately and much more 
simply by drafting a general provision for relief from unreasonable 
hardship. · 
2. Public Hearings 
The hearing provisions of section 119 are as difficult to fathom as 
its substantive requirements, but not because of unnecessary com-
plexity: with respect to hearings the statute is excessively cryptic. 
The House bill would have combined smelter orders with other 
delayed-compliance orders under what became section l 13(d) and 
would have subjected both to a "public hearing" requirement. 122 As 
adopted, section 119 contains only a backhanded reference to "any 
hearing conducted under this section, in the case of an application 
... for a sec;ond order."123 It makes no mention of any hearing for 
the first order, and it does not explicitly require one for the second. 
To unravel this mystery, we must follow the bill's path through 
the Conference Committee. Two things occurred in the Conf eience. 
First, the Committee accidentally omitted the- explicit hearing re-
quirement from section 119 when it removed smelter orders from 
section 113( d)'s general provision for delayed compliance. Second, 
the Committee deliberately limited smelter-order hearings to renew-
121. Splitting the Kennecott doctrine also makes comparison of smelter extensions with 
§ I 13(d)'s extension provisions more difficult. However, understanding the distinct purposes 
of the smelter provisions and the general DCO provision clears most of the bramble. For 
instance, § 119, unlike § I 13(d), does not authorize postponement of compliance with either 
primary or secondary ambient standards. This distinction makes sense if the intermittent or 
dispersive controls sanctioned under § 119 are not unreasonably expensive; if they are, the 
smelter may receive some relief under general provisions of§ I 13(d). On the other hand,§ 119 
permits extensions up to nine years longer than § I 13(d), since Congress knew the economic 
barriers to strict smelter compliance were not amenable to quick solution. Nevertheless, Con-
gress's general philosophy of technology-forcing precluded an open-ended extension provision 
even for smelters: Not intending "to force some smelters to close at the end of 10 years" and 
not "certain that the necessary means of emission limitation . . . be made reasonably avail-
able," the House Committee was nonetheless ''unwilling to concede at this point that the nec-
essary development work cannot be completed within that [10 year] period," H.R. REP. No. 
294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 
1140. Congress instead chose to leave subsequent amendment, if necessary, as a safety valve. 
Id. 
122. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368-69 (1977). 
123. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(2)(B) (Supp. I 1977). 
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als after the initial order. As the Conference Committee explained, 
"orders may be issued for an initial 5-year extension without public 
hearings" except in special cases;124 but "prior to granting a second 
order ... , there must be notice and a public hearing." 125 
Unfortunately, the Conference Report does not say why the 
Committee deleted the hearing requirement for an initial order. By 
requiring each applicant to establish that it met statutory criteria 126 
instead of flatly postponing the continuous-control requirement for 
all existing smelters, Congress seems to have indicated its recogni-
tion that local circumstances - the size of the operation, the height 
of preexisting stacks, the prevailing weather, the surrounding ter-
rain - may determine whether an acid plant will achieve ambient 
standards. These adjudicative facts, which seem to warrant a hear-
ing, are no less relevant to initial orders than to renewal. 
Evidently, then, it was not these adjudicative facts that prompted 
Congress to require a renewal hearing. Indeed the hearing is appar-
ently to be a "legislative" one127 better suited to determining facts of 
general applicability, such as the state of developing technology. 
Congress apparently thought Kennecott resolved the technology is-
sue for initial orders, but that the question should be reexamined at 
renewal time in 1983. 
Thus the critical adjudicative facts are to be determined upon 
renewal in a legislative hearing, and upon initial application by 
whatever procedure the EPA may devise. I have argued above that 
legislative hearings are less than ideal for this purpose, 128 and a 
wholly documentary procedure would still more seriously inhibit 
meaningful public participation. Since Congress agreed that public 
participation was essential, 129 it should have required an adjudica-
tory hearing for both initial and renewal smelter orders, and the 
EPA should use its discretion to provide one. 
124. When the applicant proposes avoiding the use of any continuous controls, a hearing 
on the record is required. See 42 U.S.C. § 7419(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977). 
125. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. Coon 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1502, 1519. 
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 7419(a)(2)(B) (Supp. I 1977). 
127. In the House bill, the "public hearing" requirement applied both to smelter orders 
and to delayed-compliance orders under what became§ I 13(d), and the accompanying Report 
explained that a legislative hearing was intended, see H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
358, 368 (1977). 
128. See text at notes 76-85 supra. Since the statute gives no right to obtain such an order, 
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. Coon CoNo. & Ao. 
NEWS 1077, 1146, the Constitution does not require an adjudicatory hearing unless the regula-
tions confer an entitlement. See note 83 supra. 
129. See notes 23 & 76-77 supra and accompanying text. 
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B. Emergency Suspensions 
Fuel shortages during "the severe winter of 1977"130 prompted 
the House to include a provision - once ·again separate from section 
113(d)-that would have allowed governors to suspend implemen-
tation-plan requirements temporarily in the face of a serious "eco-
nomic or energy emergency."131 The Conference Committee split 
this provision into two dist~ct parts, codified in sections l l0(f) and 
(g).132 
Section 1 I0(f), the more significant of the two, regulates "energy" 
emergencies. "Upon application by the owner or operator of a fuel 
burning stationary source," a governor "after notice and opportunity 
for public hearing . . . may petition the President" to determine per-
sonally that an emergency exists "of such severity" as to require "a 
temporary suspension of any part" of a state-adopted implementa-
tion plan. 133 If the President so :finds, the governor may suspend for 
not over four months "any part" of the plan if a suspension will alle-
viate "high levels of unemployment or loss of necessary energy sup-
plies for residential dwellings."134 A section ll0(f) suspension is not 
renewable, 135 and the Administrator may veto it if it does not meet 
the stipulated criteria. 136 
Within months of its enactment, section l lO(f) was invoked. A 
prolonged coal strike in the winter of 1977-1978 reduced fuel sup-
plies in several states to dangerously low levels. Ohio, followed by 
six other states, sought and received a presidential declaration of 
emergency. 137 
The Ohio experience illustrates several weaknesses in the emer-
gency provision. First, although the statute unambiguously requires 
"opportunity for a public hearing" before the governor seeks presi-
dential action, the President declared the Ohio emergency without 
benefit of a hearing, instead requiring that one be held within the 
next seven days. 138 Later the EPA feebly explained that, while this 
130. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE 
CONG & AD. NEWS 1077, 1281. 
13 I. See id. at 354. 
132. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, §§ I IO(f), (g), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(f), (g) (Supp. I 
1977). 
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(I) (Supp. I 1977). 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(1)·(3) (Supp. I 1977). The President may issue such an order for a 
federally adopted plan. 42 U.S.C. § 74IO(f)(4) (Supp. I 1977). 
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(2) (Supp. I 1977). 
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 74IO(f)(3) (Supp. I 1977). 
137. See 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1579, 1923 (1978). 
138. See id. at 1726. 
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action "may not have been strictly in accordance with the procedural 
requirements," it was taken "in light of the need to respond quickly 
to a crisis." 139 But Congress adopted the hearing requirement to en-
sure that the public interest in a clean environment weigh heavily in 
the energy emergency balance, and the failure to respect it was 
flagrant. Of course, advance hearings are not always practicable in 
emergencies; but the statute makes no accommodation for that situa-
tion. If Congress, upon reflection, is unhappy with the balance that 
the statute strikes, it should amend. 
Second, although the President's declaration purported to au-
thorize suspension only of particulate regulations, Ohio suspended 
sulfur-oxide regulations as well. 140 The statute's phrasing superfi-
cially favors Ohio's interpretation: If the President finds suspension 
of "any part" of the plan necessary, the state may suspend "any 
part" of.the plan if to do so will alleviate hardship. Ohio's conclu-
sion is not unavoidable, however, for by repeating the term "any 
part" Congress may have intended to allow the state to suspend only 
what the President thought required suspending. Although an EPA 
official opined that Ohio's action "seemed" legal, 141 the President's 
interpretation more readily corresponds with the congressional insis-
tence on presidential control of suspensions. 142 This problem stems 
from the needlessly complex institutional structure of section l lO(f ), 
which goes overboard by requiring the governor, the President, and 
the EPA all to concur in a decision that must be made swiftly. 
The President also limited the declaration to thirty days, 143 and 
then renewed it for another thirty. 144 These dispositions pose two 
problems. First, the statute flatly prohibits renewal of suspensions: 
"Not more than one such suspension may be issued for any source 
on the basis of the same set of circumstances or . . . the same emer-
gency." 145 On the other hand, the statute mandates that a suspen-
sion is to be effective "for a maximum of four months or such lesser 
period as may be specified in a disapproval order of the Administra- · 
139. Id. at 1727. 
140. See id. at 1579. 
141. Id. 
142. The statute preserves ultimate federal control through the EPA's power to veto the 
suspension if it will not help to alleviate the emergency, but Congress thought that authority 
insufficient; the President's prior determination that relaxation of standards may be necessary 
is an independent requirement. 
143. See 8 ENVIR. REP., supra note 137, at 1579. 
144. See id. at 1780. 
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(2) (Supp. I 1977). 
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tor." 146 Since the governor is supposed to issue the suspension, it 
would seem that the governor, and not the President, determines the 
duration of the relief within the four-month maximum. Thus, it may 
be that the President had no power to limit the state's initial author-
ity to thirty days, and that his later renewal of the suspension was 
not only illegal, but also unnecessary. 
On the other hand, allowing the President to determine the dura-
tion as well as the existence of the emergency fits I)lore compatibly 
with the congressional policy of presidential control. The President 
has power to define the geographical scope of the emergency, for he 
may determine that either a "national" or a "regional" emergency 
exists, and only governors of states "covered by the President's deter-
mination" may issue suspensions. 147 The statute likewise requires a 
presidential finding that "temporary" suspension may be necessary 
to deal with the emergency. 148 This provision arguably empowers 
the President to define the duration of the emergency, and indicates 
that the four-month limitation is an additional safeguard, not a li-
cense for governors to give longer relief than the President thinks 
necessary. 149 
If the President is to be bothered personally with determining 
whether an emergency exists, he should be given clear authority to 
define the emergency in all respects, including its duration. More-
over, since there is no reason to believe that energy emergencies will 
last only four months, Congress's limitation in section 1 IO(f) seems 
artificial. The renewable thirty-day suspensions authorized in the 
Ohio case were a much more responsible, flexible course than the 
nonrenewable four-month suspension apparently contemplated by 
the statute. 
The basic policy of section l IO(f) is beyond criticism, for it may 
sometimes be better to violate even primary ambient standards than 
to allow widespread loss of jobs or of residential heating. President 
Carter, however, sounded an appropriate word of caution in declar-
ing an emergency in Kentucky: Suspensions should be granted 
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(3) (Supp. I 1977). 
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(l) (Supp. I 1977). Similarly, I have argued above that the Presi-
dent may determine the pollutants for which controls may be relaxed. See text at notes 140-42 
supra. 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
149. The ban on renewal orders applies only to the "suspension ... issued to a source," 
not to the President's emergency declaration. However, in Ohio's case this distinction would 
have made no difference since the Governor quite properly had not attempted to grant suspen-
sions of greater duration than the emergency that had been declared. See 8 ENVIR. REP., supra 
note 137, at 1579. 
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"sparingly and as a 'last resort," since turning off a precipitator might 
save only a small amount of energy yet create a substantial health 
risk. 150 Section 11 O(f), like most of the variance provisions of the 
Clean Air Act, does not require a determination that the costs of 
compliance exceed the benefits. 
In short, like all the other variance provisions, section llO(f) is 
too restrictive in some respects, too lax in others, and too detailed to 
be free from serious ambiguities and drafting errors. Energy emer-
gencies, like the other special problems for which complicated vari-
ance provisions were scattered almost randomly throughout the Act, 
could have been handled more rationally by a general provision al-
lowing variance for unreasonable hardship. 
Section 11 O(g), the second emergency provision, was reduced to 
minor significance by the Conference Committee. The governor, 
without prior federal approval but subject to subsequent EPA rever-
sal, may temporarily suspend a plan requirement for up to four 
months151 when necessary "to prevent the closing for one year or 
more of any source" resulting in "substantial increases in unemploy-
ment." 152 As in section l IO(f), the provision does not require that 
the unemployment be unreasonable in comparison with the benefits 
of compliance. But the kicker is that section l IO(g) applies only 
when the state has submitted a proposed plan revision that "meets 
the requirements of this section" and the EPA has failed to pass 
upon the revision within the period prescribed by the statute. 153 
Since "the requirements of this section" include assurance that ambi-
ent standards will not be violated, 154 section 11 O(g) amounts only to 
transforming the EP A's agreement with the state determination from 
a condition precedent into a condition subsequent during an eco-
nomic emergency. 
III. NONATIAINMENT AREAS 
A. Background 
The attentive reader may have observed that the bewildering ar-
ray of specialreliefprovisions in sections 113(d), 119, and llO(f) and 
(g) does essentially nothing for poor Los Angeles, which we left fac-
150. Id. at 1648. 
151. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(g)(2) (Supp. I 1977). 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(g)(l)(B) (Supp. I 1977). 
153. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(g)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
154. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 1977). 
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ing an eighty percent arterial blockage in the summer of 1977.155 
Moreover, Los Angeles was by no means alone. 
The basic requirement of the 1970 Act, it will be remembered, 
was that primary ambient standards be achieved no later than five 
years after plan approval, which for the initial standards meant 1977. 
In 1975, however, the EPA reported to Congress that "[o]f the 247 
air quality control regions in the Nation, 60 are projected not to meet 
standards by statutory deadlines" with respect to particulates, and 
many would fail to meet other standards as well. 156 If the deadlines 
had been strictly enforced, existing sources in those regions would 
have been shut down, with seriously disruptive effects. Moreover, 
construction of new sources in a noncomplying region seemed to be 
precluded altogether, since new emissions would contribute to con-
tinuing violations of the primary standard.157 
Agreeing that section 110 could not be read "to allow a major 
new source to make an existing primary NAAQS violation worse"158 
but unwilling to abort all new sources, the EPA adopted an "offset" 
or "tradeofl'' policy. A major new source would be permitted in an 
area not meeting an ambient standard if, among other things, its 
emissions of the off ending pollutant were offset by reductions of ex-
isting emissions sufficient to produce "a positive net air quality bene-
fit in the affected area."159 Since this policy could not prevent the 
shutdown of existing sources in places like Los Angeles, the EPA 
also sought from Congress the power to extend plan deadlines 
"where transportation measures are necessary for the attainment of 
... [ambient] standards, and where the implementation of such 
control measures would have serious adverse social or economic ef-
fects." 160 The offset policy and the EPA's legislative proposal were 
the raw materials from which the Conference Committee produced 
Part D of the 1977 Amendments, "Plan Requirements for Nonat-
155. See text at note 7 supra. 
156. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 207-08 (1977), reprinted in U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1286 (reprinting letter from EPA Administrator Russell Train to 
Senator Edmund Muskie, May 12, 1975). 
157. See id. at 210, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1289. Using similar 
reasoning, the Illinois Pollution Control Board held that new connections to a municipal sew-
age treatment facility not meeting effluent standards would violate those standards themselves. 
League of Women Voters v. North Shore San. Dist., 1 Ill. P.C.B. 369, 384-85 (1971). 
158. 41 Fed. Reg. 55527 (1976). 
159. 41 Fed. Reg. 55528-29 (1976). The Illinois Board adopted a similar offset policy by 
allowing new connections to overloaded sewers as long as they were offset by corresponding 
reductions elsewhere. Currie, supra note 89, at 422. 
160. See 4 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2004 (1974); Currie, supra note 2, at 389-90. 
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tainment Areas"161 -those Air Quality Control Regions, or por-
tions of regions, in which "any national ambient air quality 
standard" is not met.162 
The heart of the new provisions is section 172, which effectively 
authorizes postponing the date for compliance with primary stan-
dards until 1982 or, in the case of oxidants or carbon monoxide, until 
1987, if that is "as expeditiously as practicable."163 Subject to speci-
fied conditions, a new state plan may both relax requirements appli-
cable to existing sources and allow the construction of new sources. 
The nonattainment provisions are a major concession to reality. 164 
The statute, however, goes about all this in a curiously round-
about way. First, it nowhere states explicitly that the Administrator 
may approve a plan not meeting the three-year deadline of section 
l 10(a)(2)(A). 165 Further, in contrast to the provisions governing pro-
mulgation of initial plans, 166 the new statute does not necessarily 
authorize the Administrator to prescribe an appropriate nonattain-
ment-area plan if the state fails to do so. 167 Instead, it relies princi-
161. For a detailed explication of the new requirements, see Raffle, Prevention of Significant 
.Deterioration and Nonallainment Under the Clean Air Act-A Comprehensive Review, ENVlR. 
REP. (BNA) Monograph No. 27 (1979). 
162. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 171(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (Supp. I 1977), 
referring to§ 107(d)(l){A)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(l)(A)-(c) (Supp. I 1977). "Attainment" ar-
eas, those in which "any" ambient standard is not shown to be violated, are subject to distinct 
statutory requirements designed to prevent "significant deterioration." 42 U.S.C., §§ 7471, 
7407(d)(l)(D), (E) (Supp. I 1977). The same area may thus be classified as an attainment area 
for one pollutant and as a nonattainment area for another. 
163. 42 U.S.C. § 7502{a)(2) (Supp. I 1977). The EPA's offset regulations were to remain in 
force until mid-1979, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 129(a). See H.R. REP. No. 564, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. Cooe CONG. & Ao. News 1502, 1538. 
For the EPA's interpretation of the new requirements, see 44 Fed. Reg. 20372 (1979) (to be 
codified in 40 C.F.R. § 52). An earlier memorandum on the subject is located at 8 ENVJR. 
REP. (BNA) 1714 (1978). The agency's revised offset policy, which governs in the interim, 
may be found in 44 Fed. Reg. 3282 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 51, App. S). 
164. Interim relief for communities like Los Angeles was provided by a new§ l lO(c)(4), 42 
U.S.C. § 7410(c)(4) (Supp. I 1977), which authorized a governor, "after notice and opportunity 
for public hearing," to suspend certain transportation control requirements pending submis-
sion of a nonattainment plan. The provisions subject to suspension were those requiring ret-
rofit of noncommercial vehicles, reduction of on-street parking, and "gas rationing which the 
Administrator finds would have seriously disruptive and widespread economic or social ef-
fects." The suspension was to last only until January 1, 1979, or until the state submitted its 
revision, "whichever is earlier." However, the revision is ineffective until approved by the 
EPA; between its submission and approval there may be widespread violations. The Agency 
will presumably overlook them, but the matter should not have been left to the Administrator's 
discretion. 
165. That the extension is approvable is implicit; otherwise the entire nonattainment provi-
sion would be of no effect. 
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 74IO(a)(l), (c){l) (Supp. I 1977). 
167. The statute authorizes federal revision only when ambient standards are altered or the 
Administrator finds an existing plan inadequate. 42 U.S.C. §§ 74IO{a)(2)(H)(ii), (c)(l)(C) 
(Supp. I 1977). Yet the nonattainment provisions apply wherever ambient standards are vio-
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pally on blackmail: Any state failing to adopt a satisfactory 
nonattainment plan by mid-1979 faced not only a ban on the con-
struction of new major stationary sources contributing to ambient 
violations, 168 but the loss of federal funds for construction of high-
ways169 and sewage-treatment facilities as well. 170 
Economic necessities would doubtless have brought about de 
facto relaxations of the deadlines even if the statute had not been 
amended. What Congress was trying to coerce was rather the adop-
tion of the accompanying provisi_ons for assuring compliance as soon 
as practicable. Even so, the means seem ill-suited to the end. Con-
gress could better have assured the desired revisions by requiring the 
EPA to make them if the states defaulted. Moreover, it seems both 
unfair to innocent owners of new sources and contrary to the federal 
nonattainment policy that the remedy for state inaction is to forbid 
new construction altogether. 171 
Nevertheless, despite some delays, the states are falling into 
line; 172 nonattainment plans will in all likelihood soon be universal. 
lated, including any areas in which the existing plan, while not being enforced, is facially 
adequate. 
168. Section l 10(a}(2)(I) requires that a plan forbid construction or modification of such a 
source after June 30, 1979, unless at the time a permit is sought "such plan meets the require-
ments of part D." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I) (Supp. I 1977). Section 172 provides in tum that a 
plan satisfying § 110(a}(2)(I) must assure attainment of ambient standards by the appropriate 
1982 or 1987 deadlines. 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. I 1977). 
169. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a) (Supp. I 1977). This prohibition applies only to states failing to 
adopt plans for transportation sources. 
170. 42 U.S.C. § 7616(b)(2) (Supp. I 1977). The authority to withhold sewage funds is 
discretionary. 
171. Moreover, the EPA has warned that broad application of the provisions for cutting off 
federal grants could have "disastrous effects." 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1351 (1978). 
172. Section 406(d) of the 1977 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 795, as amended 
Pub. L. No. 95-190 § 14(b)(6}, 91 Stat. 1405 (not codified in 42 U.S.C.), imposed a deadline of 
August 7, 1978, or nine months after adoption of implementing regulations, whichever was 
later, for submission of revised plans "required" by the amendments. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 
note (West 1978). The EPA translated the nine-month requirement into a January I, 1979 
deadline. See 44 Fed. Reg. 20372, 20373 (1979). Only seven states met those deadlines. See 9 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1739 (1979). The EPA, however, valuing chari~ above obedience to the 
statute, took several steps to reduce hardship. The construction bar was deemed to apply only 
to permits for which application was made after July I, 1979, later applications would be 
processed immediately so that construction could begin as soon as the plan was approved; 
plans with minor deficiencies would be conditionally approved so that construction could pro-
ceed; and funds would be withheld only from states that did not make good-faith efforts to 
· comply. 44 Fed. Reg. 35679 (1979). By November 1979 most states had submitted revised 
plans, and though the bulk of them had not been approved, the EPA said it expected only 
"isolated" interference with planned construction. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1472-73 (1979). 
Transition problems were further complicated by the decisions in United States Steel Corp. 
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979), and in Sharon Steel Corp. · 
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979), setting aside the EPA's 
designation of nonattainment areas in Alabama and Pennsylvania on the ground that there 
was insufficient cause for departing from the notice-and-co=ent procedures of 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b) & (c) (1976). With more respect for congressional policy than for statutory language, 
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The following sections examine the requirements for such plans, first 
for existing and then for new sources of pollution. 
B. Existing Sources 
I. 1982 Requirements 
As far as existing sources are concerned, the basic requirements 
of a 1982 nonattainment plan are found in the apparently redundant 
provisions of sections 172(b )(2) and (3): The new plan must "pro-
vide for the implementation of all reasonably available control 
measures as expeditiously as practicable," and it must "require, in 
the interim, reasonable further progress . . . including such reduc-
tion in emissions from existing sources in the area as may be ob-
tained through the adoption, at a minimum, of reasonably available 
control technology."113 
The Senate Report emphasized that both lead time and "eco-
nomic or social cost" could be considered in determining what was 
"reasonably available."174 Moreover, despite a disclaimer that "this 
bill does not define reasonable measures," 175 the Report gives spe-
cific examples that will doubtless be accorded considerable deference 
in administering section 172: While "an inspection and maintenance 
program [for vehicles] is a reasonable measure," gasoline rationing 
"currently" is not, nor is "retrofitting existing cars with currently 
available devices." 176 But this provision, reflecting the need it was 
designed to meet, postpones only the impracticable: Los Angeles 
need not shut down tomorrow, but it must take all reasonable meas-
ures as quickly as it can. 
Conspicuously missing from section 172, however, as from the 
the Fifth Circuit added by way of soothing advice that the ban on new construction would not 
apply until plan revisions were actually adopted in accordance with the nonattainment provi-
sions. Until then, the court decreed, the EPA offset ruling would govern. 
173. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(2), (3) (Supp. I 1977). 
174. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1977). The same term is employed in con-
nection with smelter orders in§ Il9(c)(I). See text at notes 108-11 supra. 
175. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1977). 
176. Id. The EPA has proposed to determine what transportation-control measures are 
"reasonably available" on "a case-by-case basis," with presumption that measures listed in 
§ 108(f)(l)(A) (as to which the Agency is to publish information) are reasonably available. 44 
Fed. Reg. 20372, 20377 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 52). 
To help states achieve ambient standards in nonattainment areas, Congress in § 177, 42 
U.S.C. § 7507 (Supp. I 1977), sensibly permitted them to adopt new-vehicle emission standards 
more stringent than federal standards. Those standards, however, must be identical to the 
ones adopted by California and approved by the EPA under the existing California exception. 
This scheme assures that vehicle manufacturers will not be required to produce cars meeting 
more than present dual standards. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 213, 310-11 
(1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1292, 1389-90. 
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delayed-compliance provisions of section 113(d), is any requirement 
that the present impracticability . of compliance with the original 
deadline not be attributable to the past sluggishness or recalcitrance 
of the discharger.177 The Amendments thus appear to permit a state 
to grant a polluter additional time because the operator has made 
timely compliance no longer "reasonable" by sitting on its corporate 
rump. True, section 172 does not require a state to do so; theoreti-
cally, the state may choose not to submit a revised plan. Moreover, 
the amendments do not disturb Union Electric's holding that a state 
may submit a plan more stringent than federal law requires. 178 But 
as in the case of section 113( d), I do not think that Congress should 
have granted states the power to insulate dischargers from penalties 
for inexcusable violations of federal law. 
While the requirements of "reasonably available control meas-
ures" and "reasonably available control technology" appear essen-
tially duplicative with respect to existing sources, 179 the provision for 
"reasonable further progress"180 goes further. The statute defines 
"reasonable further progress" as "annual incremental reductions in 
emissions . . . sufficient . . . to provide for attainment of the . . . 
ambient . . . standards by the date required"; it calls for "substantial 
reductions in the early years following approval or promulgation" 
and "regular reductions thereafter."181 Thus in this context "reason-
able" does not mean at reasonable cost; regular reductions are de-
manded whether or not practicable, contrary to the sensible policy of 
accommodation underlying the entire nonattainment provision.182 
The prospects for achieving "reasonable further progress" in Los 
Angeles under this standard seem bleak. The development of public 
transportation, perhaps the city's most promising approach to its 
177. See text at notes 39-42 supra. 
178. Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
179. The requirement that the plan adopt all reasonably available technology "at a mini-
mum," however, seems to anticipate that even unreasonably expensive measures may be re-
quired. 
180. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(3) (Supp. I 1977). 
181. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (Supp. I 1977). The EPA construes this definition to require a 
"straight-line rate" of progress determined by "dividing the total emission reductions required 
•.• by the number of years between 1979 and the date projected for attainment," allowing 
"some lag" in the early years "if immediate compliance is not possible." See 8 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) 1714, 1715 (1978). 
182. The legislative history confirms this interpretation. The House bill would have re-
quired reduction of emissions in equal two-year installments. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 212 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1077, 1291. 
While the Conference Committee thought this requirement too rigid, it stressed that "regular, 
consistent emission reductions will be demonstrated .•. throughout the period," H.R. REP. 
No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 
1502, 1538. 
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problem, seems less likely to cause substantially equal incremental 
reductions in emissions than a dramatic improvement several years 
hence. Los Angeles may yet have to reduce gasoline sales ten percent 
a year. 
2. 1987 Requirements 
A revised plan must meet the conditions already discussed, along 
with others applicable to new sources, in order to obtain an exten-
sion to 1982, when Congress intended that most ambient standards 
would be achieved. To qualify for extension of oxidant and carbon-
monoxide standards to 1987, a plan must meet additional conditions. 
Among other things, the plan must identify new measures, not pres-
ently feasible, that will be necessary for attainment by 1987; it must 
provide for "a vehicle emission control inspection and maintenance 
program"; and by 1982 it must be amended to "contain enforceable 
measures to ensure attainment" by December 21, 1987.183 The inter-
relationship of these requirements with that of "reasonable further 
progress" is not clear. On the one hand, the Conference Report 
flatly confirms what the 1987 conditions appear to suggest on their 
face: the state "need not make a commitment in 1979 to implement" 
measures not "reasonably available."184 On the other hand, the 1987 
provisions do not in terms purport to modify the clear 1982 require-
ment of "annual incremental reductions" regardless of cost. 
The Conference Report also states that, as a further condition for 
the 1987 extension, a plan "must require that funds reasonably avail-
able to the state or local government be used to improve public 
transportation."185 The diligent reader, however, will search in vain 
· to find such a provision· in section 172, where it belongs: instead, it is 
hidden in sections 110(a)(3)(D) and 1 IO(c)(5)(B). 
Upon reading the two provisions, one almost wishes that they 
had remained hidden. Section 1 IO(a)(3)(D) requires any plan re-
vised beyond 1982 under section 172 to include measures specified 
by section 110(c)(5)(B)-specifically, "comprehensive measures 
. . . to . . . establish, expand, or improve public transportation 
measures to meet basic transportation needs, as expeditiously as 
practicable."186 While public transportation may be a promising av-
183. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(l l)-(c) (Supp. I 1977). See H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1502, 1537. 
184. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., Isl Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE 
CONG & Ao. News at 1502, 1537. 
185. Id. 
186. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(D), (c)(5)(B) (Supp. I 1977). 
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enue for achieving ambient standards in many cities, it seems im-
prudent for Congress to prescribe that course woodenly without 
knowing that it will be the most efficient means in every city. San 
Francisco's meat may well be Los Angeles's poison. Moreover, even 
if public transportation is the best available means of attaining the 
standards, Congress has once more failed to acknowledge the possi-
bility that the cost of meeting those standards may be unrealistically 
high. 
3. General Implications 
In summary, the nonattainment provisions for existing sources 
commendably recognize that more time may be necessary to avoid 
unreasonable hardship, and the "expeditiously as practicable" re-
quirement applied to each control measure demands a proper com-
parison of the costs and benefits of delay. Unfortunately, the 
provisions are marred on the one side by congressional willingness to 
allow states to reward past dilatory behavior and on the other by an 
unrealistic insistence upon annual increments of progress whether or 
not economically justifiable. Moreover, like all the other variance 
provisions they fail to acknowledge the possibility that compliance 
with primary standards may in some circumstances never be worth 
the cost. 
There is an additional problem. The absolute deadlines of 1982 
and 1987 demonstrate that the nonattainment provisions were in-
tended not as permanent parts of the statutory scheme but as a tem-
porary response to the supposedly unique problems associated with 
achieving the initial group of ambient standards. Yet it seems unrea-
sonable to expect that the achievement of other, more stringent stan-
dards promulgated in the future will be free from similar difficulties. 
If they occur, Congress will have to intervene once more, while a 
general variance provision allowing justifiable extensions, or dele-
tion of the absolute time limits of section 110, would have saved it 
the trouble. 
C. New Sources 
I. The Permit Requirement 
Under section 172(b)(6), a nonattainment-area plan rev1S1on 
must "require permits for the construction and operation of new or 
modified major stationary sources."187 The section does not specify 
187. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (Supp. I 1977). The terms "new" and "modified" have coun-
terparts in § 111, which provides for standards of performance for "new" stationary sources, 
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whether permits are required for sources outside the area but affect-
ing it. One might infer that they are not, since the construction ban 
to be imposed upon failure to adopt an adequate plan applies only to 
sources "in any nonattainment area."188 Control of outside sources, 
however, is indispensable if the goal of the nonattainment provisions 
is to be attained. The EPA's offset policy applied to sources outside 
the noncomplying area, 189 and the nonattainment sections basically 
endorsed that policy. Moreover, whether or not the permit require-
ment of section l 72(b )( 6) applies to outside sources, the EPA should 
be able to demand permits from them under the general direction of 
section 172(a)(i) that the plan provide for timely achievement of am-
bient standards in nonattainment areas. 190 Initially the Agency did 
defined by§ lll(a)(2) to include "any stationary source, the construction or modification of 
which is commenced after the publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) 
prescribing [an applicable] standard of performance .... " "Modification" in § 111 in tum 
means "any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source 
which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted." 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(2), (3) (Supp. I 
1977). The commencement of construction is not defined in § 111, but the same term is de-
fined for purposes of the provisions for prevention of significant deterioration in § 169(2), 42 
U.S.C. § 7479(2) (Supp. I 1977). The nonattainment provisions adopt the § 111 definition of 
"modification" but do not define "new sources" either explicitly or by reference. Section 
171(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(4) (Supp. I 1977). Nevertheless it seems most probable that the§ 111 
definition will be applied by analogy. 
I have discussed the meaning of the § 111 terms elsewhere, Currie, l)irect Federal Regula-
tion of Stationary Sources Under the Clean Air Act, - U. PA. L. REV.-, - (1980) (forthcom-
ing), and shall not repeat the discussion here. Suffice it to say that the problem has proved 
surprisingly complex. One point, however, deserves mention. After the decision in Alabama 
Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1082-85 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the EPA proposed to revise its 
nonattainment-plan regulations to incorporate fully the so-called "bubble" concept, under 
which there is no "increase in the amount ... emitted," and thus no permit-triggering "modi-
fication," if an increase in emissions from one machine is cancelled by reductions elsewhere in 
the same plant. See 44 Fed. Reg. 51924, 51933 (1979), reprinted in IO ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 
1112, I 121 (1979). However, ifno nonattainment plan is in effect to assure "reasonable further 
progress" toward attaining ambient standards, the individual machine will be considered a 
"source" and the "bubble" concept will not apply. The EPA correctly feared that otherwise 
rare opportunities to move toward attainment might be missed. Id. at 51932, 10 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) at 1120. 
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2){1) (Supp. I 1977). The EPA has proposed to construe this 
provision to apply to sources outside nonattainment areas but affecting them, 44 Fed. Reg. 
38583 (1979). The language, however, is to the contrary. 
189. See 41 Fed. Reg. 55524, 55526 (1976); 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3283 (1979). 
190. In the converse situation, the District of Columbia Circuit has held the EPA cannot 
under provisions for preventing deterioration of allainment areas require permits for sources in 
nonattainment areas in the same state. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1082-85 
(D.C. Cir. 1979). I have criticized this decision elsewhere, see Currie, Nondegradation and risi-
bility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 48 (1980), but the present problem is distin-
guishable, for the provision construed in Alabama Power expressly required permits only for 
construction "in any area to which this part applies," meaning an attainment area. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7475(a) (Supp. I 1977). 
In support ofits authority to impose nonattainment requirements on sources in clean areas, 
the EPA has pointed to§ 165(a)(3)(B) 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 1977), which forbids 
construction of such a source if it would cause or contribute to pollution "in excess of any . . • 
national ambient air quality standard in any air quality control region." See 44 Fed. Reg. 
51924, 51939 (1979), reprinted in IO ENVIR. REP. (BNA) lll2, 1127 (1979). But the EPA's 
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intend to apply nonattainment requirements to such sources, 191 but 
more recently it announced that it was considering changing that 
policy, suggesting that its former position would be "burdensome to 
both the permitting authority and the permit applicant."192 
Geographical considerations aside, only a "major" new source 
need apply for a permit. Nevertheless the statute may reach more 
sources than it should. Section 302G) defines a "major stationary 
source" as one with "potential to emit"193 "one hundred tons per 
year of any air pollutant."194 Hence, contrary to the EPA's position, 
the permit requirement is not limited to sources of those pollutants 
for which ambient standards have been adopted. 195 Indeed, since 
"air pollutant" includes "any physical, chemical, biological, radioac-
tive ... substance,"196 the statute apparently requires the wasteful 
process of issuing permits for sources emitting nothing more harmful 
interpretation would risk outlawing such sources even if all Part D requirements were met, 
since the new source would "contribute to" the continuing violation. Section 165 can be recon-
ciled with the nonattainment provisions by recognizing that the latter effectively postpone the 
date when ambient standards apply to the affected areas, so that new emissions do not contrib-
ute to pollution "in excess of" any currently applicable standard. 
191. 44 Fed. Reg. 20372, 20379 (1979). 
192. 44 Fed. Reg. 51924, 51939 (1979), reprinted in 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 1112, 1127 
(1979). 
193. The D.C. Circuit rejected the EPA's definition of "potential" emissions as those that 
would occur in the absence of control equipment in the context of the nondegradation provi-
sions in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Agency 
has acquiesced, proposing to redefine "potential" emissions for both purposes as those ex-
pected to result "after the application of air pollution control equipment." See 44 Fed. Reg. 
51924, 51929 (1979), reprinted in 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 1112, 1117 (1979). For criticism see 
Currie, supra note 190, at 53-60. 
194. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 302(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(i) (Supp. I 1977). 
The permit requirement applies to "major new or modified stationary sources," 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7502(b)(6) (Supp. I 1977), leaving ambiguous whether a permit is needed when a "major'' 
source undergoes a modification that increases its potential emissions by less than the 100-ton 
threshold. Congress's evident purpose to avoid the cost of processing permits in the absence of 
substantial increases in emissions suggests only "major'' modifications should qualify. In the 
context of permits for "construction" of "major'' sources in clean areas, the EP A's effort to 
limit permits to major modifications was struck down; the relevant provision defines "con-
struction" to include "modification," and the latter includes any changes that "increase" emis-
sions without regard to amount. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479(2)(C), & 741 l(a)(4) (Supp. I 1977)). The nonat-
tainrnent provisions, while similar in design, do not contain the same ironclad language. Nev-
ertheless the EPA has proposed to require permits under both provisions for any modification 
of a major source resulting in a "significant" increase in emissions, whether or not meeting the 
100-ton standard. See 44 Fed. Reg. 51924, 51958, 51956, 51952 (1979), reprinted in 10 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) at 1112, 1146, 1144, 1140 (1979). 
195. See 44 Fed. Reg. 20372, 20374 (1979), defining "major'' sources as in the revised offset 
ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3283 (1979): "any source for which the potential emission is equal 
to or greater than 100 tons per year of any of the following pollutants: particulate matter, 
sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, or carbon monoxide." This ap-
proach antedated the 1977 Amendments. See 41 Fed. Reg. 55528 (1976). 
196. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (Supp. I 1977). 
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than water. To limit the cure to the disease, Congress should have 
required permits only for sources of pollutants whose concentrations 
exceed ambient standards. 
Section 173 lists the conditions for permit issuance.197 The two 
most important conditions are discussed in the sections that follow, 
but two other conditions deserve special mention. First, all "major 
stationary sources" in the same state that are under the applicant's 
control must be "in compliance, or on a schedule for compliance, 
with all applicable emission limitations and standards" under the 
Clean Air Act. 198 This requirement should serve as a powerful in-
centive to an owner to bring other sources into line, but it may also 
inflict penalties disproportionate to the offense, especially since there 
is no exception for violations the discharger could not reasonably 
prevent.199 Second, the permit may not be issued unless the entire 
state implementation plan is "being carried out" as required by 
law.200 This requirement is even more severe, for it punishes the 
new-source applicant for the state's failure to enforce the plan 
against other dischargers, a matter over which the applicant has no 
control. 
2. Lowest Achievable Emission Rate 
To obtain a permit, a new source must comply with "the lowest 
achievable emission rate"201 (LAER). Section 171(3) defines LAER 
as "the most stringent emission limitation . . . contained in the im-
197. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. I 1977). Comparable permit provisions for new sources in 
attainment areas and for all sources under the water-pollution statute require opportunity for a 
"public hearing" before issuance or denial of a permit. 42 U.S.C. § 7575(a)(2) (Supp. I 1977); 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(l), (b)(3) (1976). The nonattainment provisions, unfortunately, do not, 
Since the permit requirement applies only to "major'' sources, the importance of each applica-
tion both to the applicant and to the public suggests the desirability of providing a full oppor-
tunity for input. Moreover, deciding whether the proposed new source meets the various 
statutory requirements may often necessitate determinations of facts peculiar to that source, 
and this consideration militates in favor of an adjudicatory hearing. Indeed, if the plan 
adopted gives the applicant a right to a permit upon meeting prescribed criteria, due process 
very likely will require that he be given the opportunity for such a hearing. See note 83 supra, 
Moreover, again in contrast to the water-pollution provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1976), 
§ 173 does not provide for EPA review to prevent issuance of a permit contravening statutory 
requirements. If the emissions from the new plant actually contravene provisions of the plan 
itself, the EPA can sue or issue an order to enforce the requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(l)-(b) 
(Supp. I 1977). However, the very basis of the permit requirement is that prevention is prefer-
able to cure. 
198. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(3) (Supp. I 1977). 
199. Presumably a discharger meeting the conditions of a DCO or other extension is "on 
schedule for compliance," but as I pointed out above, a reasonable excuse for inability to 
comply does not guarantee the issuance of a DCO. See text at notes 66-76 supra. 
200. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(4) (Supp. I 1977). 
201. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(2) (Supp. I 1977). 
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plementation plan of any State" (unless shown "not achievable") or 
"the most stringent emission limitation achieved in practice, . . . 
whichever is more stringent."202 Because LAER may not be less 
stringent than the standards of performance for new sources under 
section 111, it requires use of "the best technological system of con-
tinuous emission reduction . . . adequately demonstrated," consid-
ering cost.203 The House Report explained that, while "cost is of 
somewhat lesser weight" in determining "lowest achievable emission 
rate" than under section 111, it remains "a relevant factor'': "if the 
cost of any given . . . means of compliance is so great that new . . . 
sources could not build and operate, then emission reductions which 
necessitate [its] use ... would not be considered achievable 
"204 
The policy concern underlying this provision is unassailable -
the law ought to demand special efforts to minimize additional emis-
sions in areas where pollution levels already endanger public 
health.205 The same philosophy prompted the further rule that, if 
compliance is extended beyond 1982, the agency issuing the permit 
must analyze "altemativ~ sites, sizes, production processes, and envi-
ronmental control techniques" and insist upon a showing that "bene-
fits of the proposed source significantly outweigh the environmental 
and social costs" of its operation.206 Indeed, the latter requirement 
more accurately reflects the relevant policies than does the "lowest 
achievable" provision: The post-1982 requirement explicitly re-
quires that the benefits of the new source be balanced against the 
health risk, while the "lowest achievable" provision conclusively 
presumes that the benefits are sufficient if the owner is willing to 
install expensive technology. 
202. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (Supp. I 1977). 
203. 42 U.S'.C. § 74ll(a)(I) (Supp. I 1977). 
204. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st ~ess. 215 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CooE 
CONG & Ao. NEWS 1077, 1294. The Conference Report is in accord. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &-Ao. NEWS 1502, 1538. The 
determination of LAER is to be made by the agency issuing the permit, 42 U.S.C. § 7503(2) 
(Supp. I 1977), but for an entire "class or category of source," 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (Supp. I 
1977), and with the assistance of"guidance documents" issued by the EPA, 42 U.S.C. § 7508 
(Supp. I 1977). Contrast 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (Supp. I 1977), which for purposes of preventing 
significant deterioration of attainment areas requires the determination of best available con-
trol technology to be made "on a case-by-case basis," seeking marginal additional control at 
additional administrative cost. 
205. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 214-15 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. 
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEws 1077, 1293-94. Whether in light of the independent offset require-
ment considered at notes 210-28 i,?fra the benefits of requiring technology beyond that pre-
scribed under§ 111 justify the administrative burdens of multiple new-source standards, I am 
not certain. See generally Currie, supra note 190. 
206. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(ll)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
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Unfortunately, the statute does not say whether LAER is neces-
sary for every pollutant emitted by a major source. The EPA has 
concluded that it is not, and its position seems correct. To begin 
with, LAER is a means for achieving the purpose of the nonattain-
ment provisions, which is to minimize existing violations of ambient 
standards. 207 This purpose demands LAER only for those pollutants 
whose concentrations exceed ambient stap.dards. Moreover, the stat-
utory limitation of LAER to "major" sources208 suggests Congress 
thought the benefits of such technology not worth the cost of requir-
ing it unless the amount emitted was substantial. The fortuity that a 
source is "major" for one pollutant seems no reason to· alter that 
policy with respect to other pollutants for which the source is not 
major. Accordingly, the EPA position is that LAER is required only 
for those pollutants whose ambient standards are violated and for 
which at the same time the source is "major."209 
3. Offset and Its Alternative 
As a final condition for obtaining a permit, a new source in a 
nonattainment area must show that it either conforms to a modified 
version of the pre-1977 EPA offset policy or contains alternative pro-
visions adequate to assure that new sources do not impede overall 
progress toward timely attainment of ambient standards. 
a. The Offset Requirement 
Under this alternative, the reduction of existing emissions may 
make room for new ones. The wording of section 173(I)(A) is tricky: 
The new source is allowed only if "total allowable emissions" from 
existing and new sources are "sufficiently less than total emissions 
from existing sources allowed under the applicable implementation 
plan" at the time the permit is sought "so as to represent . . . reason-
able progress."210 Notice that the statute requires that new emissions 
207. This purpose is exemplified by the definition of "reasonable further progress" in 
§ 171(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (Supp. I 1977), and by the central requirement of§ 172{a) that 
ambient standards be achieved by 1982 or 1987. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(l) (Supp. I 1977). 
208. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(b)(6), 7503(2)(Supp. I 1977). 
209. See 44 Fed. Reg. 51924, 51959 (1979), proposing 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(3), reprinted in 
10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 1112, 1147 (1979); id. at 51941, 10 ENVIR. REP. at 1129, for a partial 
interpretation of the proposal. The pre-1977 offset policy had also required the administrative 
equivalent of LAER only "for those pollutants causing the proposed source to be defined as a 
'major' source," 41 Fed. Reg. 55528 n.2 (1976). The corresponding provision for clean areas in 
§ 165(a)(4), by contrast, requires best available technology for "each pollutant subject to regu-
lation under this chapter," whether or not subject to ambient standards and whether or not 
ambient standards are met. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (Supp. I 1977). 
210. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977). The language is taken largely from the Senate 
bill, see S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1977). 
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be more than offset: "total allowable emissions" of the off ending 
pollutant211 must actually be reduced despite the addition of the new 
source. Thus Congress viewed the addition of a new source as an 
opportunity to create additional incentives to correct existing 
problems. The reference to "emissions allowed under the . . . 
plan"212 ensures that the new-source owner will implement emission 
reductions that were not already overdue213 - the statute gives no 
credit for abatement that should have been accomplished in the 
past.214 The amount of the required reduction will vary according to 
the extent of the ambient violation and the efficacy of other plan 
measures required by the nonattainment provisions to make "rea-
sonable further progress" toward ambient standards. The necessary 
reductions must take place "by the time the [new] source is to com-
mence operation."215 
Under the pre-amendment offset policy, the EPA's guidelines 
had explicitly required not only that emission reductions exceed new 
emissions, but also that these reductions "provide a positive net air 
quality benefit in the affected area."216 This latter requirement rec-
ognized that emissions of identical quantity and concentration may 
have disparate effects on ambient quality, depending on their loca-
tions, their altitudes, and their timing. Section 173(l)(A) preserved 
the essence of the "net air quality benefit" requirement by demand-
ing offset reductions "sufficient□ . . . to represent . . . [with other 
reductions] reasonable further progress" toward timely attainment of 
211. The statute speaks flatly of "total allowable emissions," but the context strongly sug-
gests the sole concern is with those pollutants whose concentration exceeds ambient standards. 
See text at note 209 supra. 
212. The use of "allowable" rather than actual emissions as the basis for post-construction 
assessment is a necessary corollary to avoid penalizing the new source for continuing viola-
tions of the implementation plan by other sources. 
213. Pressing_this principle further, the EPA before 1977 had also refused to allow credit 
for some reductions not required by existing plans. If the plan faced revision due to nonattain-
ment of air-quality standards, credit was allowed only for reductions beyond those resulting 
from "reasonably available control measures." See 41 Fed. Reg. 55526 (1976). Since the stat-
utory offset policy applies only after approval of a plan requiring reasonably available control 
measures, the result should be the same under the statute, although the Conference Committee 
declared that before the approval of new plans the baseline for applying the offset policy 
should be the plan in effect at the time of permit application, regardless of its inadequacy. 
H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1977), reprinted in [1977) U.S. CODE CONG & 
Ao. NEWS 1502, 1538. 
214. The statutory reference to "allowable emissions" seems also to preserve the EPA's 
requirement that offset reductions be "enforceable," that is, that they be made part of the plan 
itself or written into a permit or compliance order. 41 Fed. Reg. 55530 (1976). 
215. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(l){A) (Supp. I 1977). 
216. 41 Fed. Reg. 55529 (1976). The revised interim offset policy preserved this basic re-
quirement. 44 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1979). 
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ambient standards. 211 
What is not so clear, however, is whether the statute modifies the 
EPA's requirement that this air-quality benefit occur "in the affected 
area."218 A narrow definition of "affected area" could have limited 
the applicability of offset to reductions immediately adjacent to the 
new source.219 Section 173, however, refers to a net reduction of 
emissions "in the region,"220 and in a regional sense it may be possi-
ble to make "reasonable further progress" toward attaining ambient 
standards · by improving the air in one place while degrading it in 
another. The flexible terminology appears to allow case-by-case de-
termination whether such a tradeoff does in fact represent "reason-
able further progress." In a statute characterized by a lamentable 
rigidity, 221 this latitude is a welcome rarity; one only can wish Con-
gress had provided for EPA review of state permit decisions to as-
sure that the underlying polici~s are carried out. 
How the offset provision works can be illustrated by a few exam-
ples. Suppose the owner of a steel mill presently meeting plan re-
quirements wants to construct a new basic-oxygen furnace on the 
same site. If the region where the mill is located exceeds ambient 
particulate standards, the owner may obtain the necessary offset 
credit by shutting down a set of open-hearth furnaces in the existing 
mill, or by fitting them with additional control equipment not 
required by the plan, if the resulting reduction of open-hearth emis-
sions sufficiently exceeds the new basic-oxygen emissions to "repre-
sent reasonable further progress" toward achieving the ambient 
standard. If the new plant is to be built at a considerable distance 
from the old one, the different impacts of the old and new emissions 
on ambient quality will have to be taken into account in determining 
whether "reasonable further progress" is being made. 
Even if our steelmaker has no existing emissions of its own that 
can practicably be reduced, it may benefit from the offset provisions, 
for the statute does not require that the source reducing its emissions 
be owned or operated by the person seeking to build the new one. 
Section 173(l)(A) refers to "total allowable emissions from existing 
217. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
218. 41 Fed. Reg. 55529 (1976). 
219. Citizens in Long Beach, California, for example, unsuccessfully objected to an offset 
on the ground that while it might improve air quality generally, it would worsen conditions in 
the immediate area upwind of the source of the emissions that were to be reduced. See note 
224 infra and accompanying text. 
220. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
221. See, e.g., text at notes 53-54, 62-65, 87-88, 96-102, & 121-22 supra. 
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sources in the region,''222 and the EP A's guidelines explicitly allowed 
offsets based on reductions from sources owned by others.223 The 
logic of the guidelines is impeccable; as long as net emissions are 
reduced it is immaterial who reduces them. In this way the statute 
creates a market in emission rights, making private ingenuity work 
toward improving the air. Thus our steelmaker, unwilling to retire 
its own open-hearth furnaces, may be able to pay the owner of a 
nearby foundry to close down a marginal furnace, to control it be-
yond plan requirements, or to move to another region. Such a con-
tractual offset was recently reported on a large scale in Long Beach, 
California: The state agency permitted a corporation to construct a 
new marine terminal after it agreed to pay $78,000,000 to improve 
emission control at a neighboring power plant and at a number of 
dry-cleaning establishments. 224 
The pre-1977 EPA guidelines, however, expressly forbade "bank-
ing" of emission reductions for offset against future new sources: 
"Once an emission offset has been executed for a particular new 
source, there can be no left-over credit to 'bank' for additional new 
source growth in the future."225 Thus, if our steelmaker claimed 
credit toward one new furnace when it closed an old mill last year, it 
could not claim from that closing additional credit toward construc-
tion of another furnace this year even if last year's emission reduc-
tions were great enough to have justified three or four new furnaces. 
The EP A's explanation was that offset banking "would be incon-
sistent with a basic policy of the Act and the ruling - namely, that 
at a minimum, no new source should be allowed to make existing 
[ambient] violations any worse.''226 But industry correctly pointed 
out that the refusal to allow banking penalized conscientious owners 
who had already installed the best emission controls, forcing them to 
look elsewhere for offset credit while their dawdling competitors re-
ceived credit for reductions they should have already achieved. 
Moreover, the no-banking rule operated as an incentive to delay im-
plementing additional control measures until the owner needed the 
reduction to offset expansion. Persuaded by these arguments, the 
EPA revised its interpretation after the adoption of the 1977 Amend-
ments to allow banking of offset reductions,227and it has incorpo-
222. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(l)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
223. 41 Fed. Reg. 55530 (1976). 
224. See 9 ENVJR. REP. (BNA) 691 (1978); 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2387 (1979). 
225. 41 Fed. Reg. 55529 (1976). 
226. Id. at 55526. 
227. 44 Fed. Reg. 3285 (1979). 
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rated that ruling in its guidelines for section 173.228 
b. The Alternative to Offset 
(Vol. 78:155 
Section 173(1)(B) allows the states an alternative to the case-by-
case offset policy if their plans incorporate overall limits for new-
source emissions that are counterbalanced by plan provisions that 
will reduce existing emissions enough to make "reasonable further 
progress" toward the ambient standard.229 Unfortunately, the legis-
lative history sheds little light on this vague provision. It first ap-
peared in the House bill,230 but the House Report does not explain 
its operation, saying only that it would allow "greater flexibility" 
than the EPA's existing offset policy.231 
While speculation is hazardous, another example may illustrate 
the basic outline of what Congress had in mind. If a state must re-
duce existing emissions by 2000 tons per year to achieve ambient 
standards, it may choose in its revised plan to allow an additional 
1000 to be emitted by new sources if it adopts a plan provision re-
quiring reductions totaling 3000 by the 1982 deadline, as long as 
each intervening year brings a roughly proportional net reduction. 
How the state distributes the burden of reductions is left largely to its 
own judgment, subject to the overriding requirement of "reasonable 
further progress."232 In short, like the other provisions of the 1977 
Amendments, the nonattainment provisions exemplify the patch-
work, crisis-responsive drafting that is characteristic of the Clean Air 
Act.233 
228. 44 Fed. Reg. 20380 (1979). The statutory offset language, governing new plans, re-
quires a comparison of allowable emissions "at the time the new source is to commence opera-
tion" with those "prior to the application" for its construction. Banking is not specifically 
addressed, and "prior to the application" could be taken to refer to any time before applica-
tion, implying that banking is permissible. The Committee Reports are silent. Though the 
most natural reading is that the relevant comparison is with emissions immediately prior to 
application, the EP A's interpretation is certainly reasonable enough to be sustained under 
Train v. National Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
229. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(B) (Supp. I 1977). 
230. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 388 (1977). 
231. Id. at 211, 213, reprinted in (1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1290, 1292. 
232. The plan proposed by Illinois on April I, 1979, is suggestive. While Illinois intends to 
rely principally upon case-by-case offsets, it has planned existing-source reductions sufficient 
to cover a "growth allowance," which may be drawn upon by new sources unable to obtain 
offsets. See (Draft) State Implementation Plan for the State of Illinois, vol. I, p. 5-4 (1979). 
233. The problem of new sources is complicated by the existence of an entirely separate 
permit system for major new sources in attainment areas, designed to prevent "significant dete-
rioration" of areas now clean. Clean Air Act, Part C, Subpart I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 
(Supp. I 1977). Because an area may be designated as "attainment" for one pollutant and 
"nonattainment" for another, a single source may require two permits under the same statute. 
Moreover, there are numerous large and small differences in the provisions respecting the two 
permit systems, including the definitions both of "major" sources and of the required control 
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CONCLUSION 
The bewildering menagerie of partial relief provisions in the 1977 
Act promises to be a rich source of expensive and time-consuming 
litigation. Moreover, while the amendments have avoided immediate 
economic catastrophe by alleviating the most acute problems of prior 
law, they provide only temporary symptomatic relief for the continu-
ing malady of statutory inflexibility. By placing absolute deadlines 
in the new DCO and nonattainment provisions,234 for example, Con-
gress virtually assured itself of facing the same problems again dur-
ing the 1980s. 
It is tempting to say that Congress has failed to learn from its 
mistakes. Experience with the initial set of ambient standards has 
shown the likelihood that the statutory schedule will be unrealisti-
cally tight in a number of cases. The obvious remedy, I have argued, 
is a general provision allowing individual variances or categorical 
relaxation of standards for unreasonable hardship. Yet Congress in 
1977 not only failed to enact such a provision; it deliberately shut off 
the general safety valve the EPA had discovered in the "reasonable 
time" provision of section 113(a)(4).235 The stopper is section 1 lO(h): 
Except for a primary nonferrous smelter order under section 119 of this 
title, a suspension under section llO(f) or (g) of this section (relating to 
emergency suspensions), an exemption under section 118 of this title 
(relating to certain Federal facilities), an order under section 113(d) 
(relating to compliance orders), a plan promulgation under section 
llO(c) of this section, or a plan revision under section 110(a)(3) of this 
section, no order, suspension, plan revision, or other action modifying 
any requirement of an applicable implementation plan may be taken 
with respect to any stationary source by the State or by the Administra-
tor.236 
Despite the Senate Committee's blustering statement in 1970 that 
"existing sources . . . should meet the standard of the law or be 
closed down,"237 the relief granted in 1977 shows that massive clos-
ings were not what Congress had in mind. It seems much more 
probable that Congress set absolute deadlines in order to create an 
technology. It would have made more sense to require a single permit for major new sources 
of regulated pollutants anywhere, making clear that the determination of technology and cost 
could vary according to the need for control in the particular area, and requiring a showing 
that the new source would neither contribute to significant deterioration of clean areas nor 
impede reasonable progress toward attainment in dirty ones. 
234. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (Supp. I 1977) (delayed-compliance orders); 42 U.S.C. § 7502 
(Supp. I 1977) (nonattainment areas). 
235. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § I 13(a)(4) (repealed 1977). See text at note 19 
supra. 
236. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § l lO(h), 42 U.S.C. § 74IO(i) (Supp. I 1977). 
237. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). 
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incentive for the development of new and better technology, reserv-
ing to itself the sole power to make adjustments in case good-faith 
efforts failed to do the trick. This was the explanation for the rigid . 
deadlines for motor-vehicle emissions in section 202(b), which Con-
gress set with full knowledge that the technology was not yet avail-
able.238 Similarly, the Supreme Court has described the 
implementation-plan provisions as "technology-forcing."239 And no 
doubt Congress was right in perceiving that the desired incentive was 
significantly enhanced by the fact that in order to relax the deadline, 
industry had to persuade Congress itself, not simply the BP A, that it 
had done all it could.240 Whether the additional incentive is great 
enough to justify the costs of statutory complexity and continual 
amendment is a question on which reasonable people may well disa-
gree. 
Whether Congress's aim was to force technology or to ignore the 
price of absolute health protection, it may have overlooked a signifi-
cant loophole. Section 1 IO(h) prevents only the states and the Ad-
ministrator from granting extensions not expressly authorized by 
statute; it does not limit the traditional power of the courts to con-
sider relative hardship in framing equitable decrees.241 One district 
court has already suggested that this authority survives the 1977 
Amendments, ordering compliance with a plan requirement only 
after finding that the necessary equipment was available at reason-
238. 42 U.S.C. § 752l(b) (Supp. I 1977). See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 27 
(1970). Senator Muskie, sponsor of the vehicle provisions, made clear he anticipated amend-
ment if the technology was not forthcoming. 116 CoNo. REC. 32,905 (1970). See generally 
Currie, The Mobile-Source Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 811 (1979). 
239. Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976). 
240. See Kramer, The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: A Tactical Retreat from t/1e Tech-
nology-Forcing Strategy?, 15 URB. L. ANN. 103 (1978). Professor Kramer finds "an inflexible 
attainment date" a "key ingredient" in a technology-forcing strategy. Accordingly, he views 
the 1977 liberalization of the explicit variance provisions as a step backward and the rejection 
of a general variance provision as the legislation's saving grace. Id. at 156-57. He does not 
contend, however, that the relaxations were unnecessary to avoid unreasonable hardship, or 
that industry has not made honest efforts to develop better technology. Extensions, if granted 
only upon a showing of good faith, are not inconsistent with technology-forcing. See note 238 
supra. And since the 1977 Amendments still contain absolute deadlines, even Professor 
Kramer acknowledges that they "reflect more a mid-course correction for the technology-forc-
ing strategy initially mandated in 1970 than a total rejection," Kramer, supra at 156. 
241. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (cost of abating nuisance); Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protec• 
tion Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (tempering with cost considerations the absolute 
language of the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976), in formulating a remedy). For dicta sug-
gesting that such considerations were relevant in framing judicial remedies under the imple-
mentation-plan provisions prior to 1977, see Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 509 F.2d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1975); Friends of the Earth v. PEPCO, 419 F. 
Supp. 528, 535 (D.D.C. 1976). Contra, United States v. United States Steel Corp., 9 ENVIR, 
REP. (BNA) 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ala. 1976). See Currie, Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their 
Implementation, 1976 A.B.F. RES. J. 365, 405-06. 
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able cost. 242 
Thus if Congress really means to shut down noncomplying 
sources without regard to hardship, it may have to say so more ex-
plicitly. It would be better, however, to replace the present procrus-
tean structure with a single provision allowing variances for those 
who in good faith cannot comply without unreasonable hardship. 
242. See United States v. West Penn Power Co., 460 F. Supp. 1305, 1307-12, 1313-14 
(W.D. Pa. 1978). 
